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Authors' Welfare:
COPYRIGHT AS A STATUTORY MECHANISM FOR
REDISTRIBUTING RIGHTS

Tom W. Bell'
ABSTRACT
Copyright exhibits means and ends remarkably similar to those
of social welfare programs. Yet discussions about copyright do not tend to
echo discussions about welfare. This paper examines that interesting
contrast. It begins by comparing social welfare policy to copyright policy,
uncovering several material parallels. Both welfare and copyright
primarily aim to correct the market's failure to sufficiently support a
particular class of beneficiaries. Both encourage rights-based claims to
the entitlements that they create, too. The welfare system and the
copyright system each uses statutory mechanisms to redistribute rights rights to wealth in the first instance, rights to chattels and persons in the
second - from the general public to particular beneficiary classes - the
poor and authors, respectively. Each also includes special exceptions
designed to avoid inefficient or inequitable redistributions. The charitable
gift deduction and other tax code provisions limit the welfare system's
scope, whereas copyright law offers fair use and other defenses to
infringement claims. Perhaps those and other similarities between
welfare and copyright mean little. After considering various critiques,
however, the paper concludes that we can learn important lessons from
understanding copyright as a statutory mechanism for redistributing
rights. Most notably, understanding copyright as a form of authors'
welfare suggests the need for, and potential shape of, reforms to end
copyright as we know it.
(©2003 Tom W. Bell. All Rights Reserved.
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preconceptions; Ethan Stone for research pointers; Michael Lang for his help with tax
law, my colleagues at Chapman Law School for attending a presentation of a late draft
of the paper; and Chapman Law School for a summer research grant. At appropriate
points in the paper, I also thank several other parties for their particular contributions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Social welfare' and copyright' bear striking similarities.
Both programs aspire to correct the failings of their nonpolitical, civil, and private alternatives. Both favor limited
classes of direct beneficiaries: poor people in the first instance
and authors in the second. Both social welfare and copyright
function by trumping common law rights with statutory ones,
whether by redistributing rights to fiat money or by
redistributing rights to chattels and persons. Still other
illuminating similarities exist. This paper discusses the
material similarities between social welfare and copyright, as
well as the dissimilarities between them, in greater detail. This
comparative exercise inspires several hypotheses about
copyright. Most notably, the comparison suggests that
lawmakers should apply to the "authors' welfare" program
embodied in U.S. copyright law reforms like those recently
applied to U.S. social welfare programs." Lawmakers should, in
brief, consider ending copyright as we know it.'
I Unless otherwise indicated, "social welfare" and "welfare" refer hereinafter
to U.S. political programs that aim to alleviate poverty by taking wealth from some
taxpayers and redistributing it, in the form of money or less liquid assets such as food
stamps, to a defined class of beneficiaries. That accords with common usage. See
MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE
IN AMERICA ix (rev. ed., 1996) ("Public assistance is means-tested relief. It is what we
usually think of as welfare."); THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
211 (1995) (contrasting "welfare" and "social security" in American usage); EDWARD D.
BERKOWITZ, AMERICA'S WELFARE STATE xiii (1991) ("[Mlost people understand welfare
to mean a form of government handout."). For an apt example of welfare, see Aid for
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a program effectively abolished by the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
U.S.C.). Other programs falling within the scope of "social welfare" and "welfare" as
used herein include those created by the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2011-2036 (West
Supp. 2003) (creating program to improve diets of members of low-income households)
and by the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids Act (CalWORKS
program), CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11200-11215 (West 2001) (creating program to
give cash aid and services to eligible needy California families).
2 Unless otherwise indicated, "copyright" refers hereinafter to U.S. copyright
law as expressed in the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-118 (West Supp. 2003),
as amended, and related case law.
:3 PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of U.S.C.) (repealing the federal AFDC program and replacing it
with Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF)).
4 By comparison, in 1992, presidential candidate Bill Clinton
pledged to "end
welfare as we know it." See Gwen Ifill, Clinton Presses Welfare Overhaul, Stressing Job
Trainingand Work, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at Al (quoting Sept. 9, 1992, speech by
Clinton to the National Baptist Convention); CBS This Morning: Governor Clinton
Discusses His PresidentialCandidacy (CBS television broadcast, November 14, 1991)
(statement by Clinton during on-air interview by Paula Zahn).
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Notably, this paper does not try to establish the authors'
welfare model as the only legitimate one for copyright policy.
The prevailing models, based on social utility and property,
retain unique merits. They will undoubtedly retain many
followers, too. Just as comparing flat maps based on different
projections can help us to better understand our globular
Earth, so too can we benefit from comparing different views of
copyright's manifold dimensions. This paper offers a new view
of copyright, one seen from the vantage of social welfare policy.
Although the authors' welfare model has admitted limits, the
unique insights that it affords make it a useful addition to
copyright commentary.
In assessing the claims here made on behalf of the
authors' welfare model, or indeed any academic's claims,
readers might find helpful guidance in the standards applied to
U.S. utility patents. Such patents must evince novelty,5 nonobviousness,6 and usefulness,7 among other things If given fair
consideration, the authors' welfare model will meet analogous
standards. Existing commentary has not presented the same
view of copyright, leastwise not in terms that render the
present argument wholly derivative.' Admittedly, extant law
and scholarship' ° provide many of the ideas that this paper
5

35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West Supp. 2003).

6

Id. § 103.

7

Id. § 101.

8 A patent must also describe the claimed invention, and the manner of

practicing it, "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms" as to allow others to
understand and benefit from it. Id. § 112. Although I've certainly aspired to that
standard, too, I forbear arguing that I've met it. The proof of a writing comes in its
reading.
" See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; or, How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love Intellectual Property, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 453, 475-82
(2002) (arguing that intellectual property policies must, as tax policy already does,
address questions of distributive justice); Larry Urbanski & Dennis S. Karjala,
Corporate Welfare via Copyright Welfare, in THE PROGRESS REPORT: GUEST EDITORIAL
(condemning as "copyright welfare" proposal to extend copyright term), at
http://www.progress.orglarchive/copy.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2003); Dennis S. Kaijala,
Congress Moves To Extend Copyright Welfare, in OPPOSING COPYRIGHT EXTENSION
(June 1996) (unpublished op-ed submission) (condemning as "copyright welfare"
proposal to extend copyright term), at http://www.law.asu.edulHomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary/opedharm.html (last visited on Aug. 8,
2003). See also Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in
COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 6-7
(Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (suggesting a parallel between
corporate welfare or social welfare, on the one hand, and copyrights or patents on the
other).
1 In patent parlance, "prior art." See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp.
2003).
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expands upon and synthesizes." Scholars and inventors alike
necessarily build on others' work, however. It should thus
suffice if, as seems plausible, the whole of the authors' welfare
model is not obvious to people well-versed in copyright
commentary."'
As for usefulness, well, it takes a bold academic to make
broad claims on that front. In patent law, however, the
usefulness standard requires little more than that an invention
have some function,'" from the important and beneficial" to the
minor and harmful." On that forgiving measure, the authors'
welfare model ought to pass muster.'" While acknowledging
that commentators who dislike metaphorical or analogical legal
reasoning may prejudge this project, I do not feel compelled to
defend my methodology.'7 Many - perhaps most commentators and courts find it useful to understand one
concept by contrasting and comparing it to another. On some
" A very early formulation of the fundamental idea, for instance, appears in
Lord Macaulay's characterization of copyright as a "tax on readers for the purpose of
giving a bounty to writers." Lord Thomas B. Macaulay, 56 Parl. Deb. 341, 350 (3d Ser.)
(1841) (Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on Feb. 5, 1841). I thank Prof.
Peter D. Junger for reminding me of that copyright chestnut.
2 Or, to borrow the language of the Patent
Act, it suffices "ifthe differences
between the .. .[authors' welfare argument] and the prior art are such that the ...
matter as a whole would [not] have been obvious at the time the [argument] was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said . . . matter pertains." 35
U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West Supp. 2003).
,3See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 § II.B.2(a),
1098
(2001) ("If the applicant has asserted that the claimed invention is useful for any
particular practical purpose ... and the assertion would be considered credible by a
person of ordinary skill in the art," examiners should not reject the application for lack
of utility.).
14 See, e.g., Thomas Edison's patent for an
electric lamp, U.S. Patent No.
223,898 (issued Jan. 27, 1880).
' See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (overturning decision that because patent aimed to increase sales by deception, it
failed the usefulness standard).
16 Perhaps something like patent law's operability
test offers a more telling
measure of an academic argument. On that test, an argument would have to function
as claimed. Compare McKenzie v. Cummings, 24 App. D.C. 137 (D.C. Cir. 1904)
(holding that a voting machine only 99% accurate failed to operate as claimed) with
Coffee v. Guerrant, 3 App. D.C. 497 (D.C. Cir. 1894) (holding a tobacco-stemming
device operable despite its 30% failure rate). I would wager that the authors' welfare
model of copyright can meet that standard too, though it will take others' critical
review to truly test this paper's arguments.
17 For those who take particular offense at
the use of metaphors in legal
reasoning, however, I observe that I do not equate social welfare to copyright. Indeed,
my conclusion that we ought to make copyright policy more closely resemble welfare
policy of necessity admits that the two differ in at least that regard. See infra Part V. I
detail other differences, too. See infra Part III.
,'This probably holds especially true with regard to copyright policy, which
has always developed under the sway of metaphorical reasoning. See Mark Rose,
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accounts, we cannot help but reason in that way.'9 At the least,
then, a few readers ought to find the form of argument used
here congenial.
So goes a brief account of this paper's thesis and
methodology. What does the paper contain? Part II explores the
parallels between welfare and copyright. It finds material
similarities between the justifications upon which they rely,
the beneficiaries they target, and the redistributions they
effectuate. Part III counters with a review of the dissimilarities
between welfare and copyright. Although those prove
noteworthy, they do not render the authors' welfare model
materially deficient. Part IV considers and rebuts objections
that the comparison between welfare and copyright is
irrelevant. As an applied proof of the comparison's relevance,
Part V explores some of the ramifications of understanding
copyright as authors' welfare. That exploration leads, among
other things, to the conclusion that lawmakers should consider
reforming copyright policy in a manner analogous to recent
welfare reforms.
What does this paper not say? It does not contrast the
constitutionality of U.S. social welfare programs with that of
U.S. copyright policy. True, some commentators have argued
that the former has only shaky constitutional foundations,'
whereas no one doubts that federal lawmakers have the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors ...the exclusive Right to
their ... Writings .... "' I assume, however, that U.S. courts

Copyright and Its Metaphors, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) ("[Mletaphors have
contributed to the tendency to think about copyrights as permanent and absolute
property rights."). See also A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 860
(1995) ("It is old news that common-law legal reasoning is both analogical and
taxonomical, and that metaphor is a powerful tool for both.") (footnotes omitted).
'9 Rose, supra note 18, at 3 ("Metaphors are not just ornamental; they
structure the way we think about matters and they have consequences."). See generally
Dan Hunter, Reason is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197
(2001); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
20 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 306-08, 314-24 (1985) (arguing that the Takings Clause in principle
forbids almost all federal welfare programs).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8. That is not to say that everyone agrees on the
constitutional scope of the power thereby granted to lawmakers. See, e.g., Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 783-90 (2003) (relating - and disposing of - petitioners'
arguments against constitutionality of copyright term extension).
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will not soon, if ever, find federal welfare programs
unconstitutional.V
Nor does this paper say a great deal about the parallels
between welfare and patents. Anyone familiar with both
copyright and patent policy will find it easy - indeed, almost
irresistible - to extend an "authors' welfare" analysis to an
"inventors' welfare" one. And, indeed, the obvious similarities
between copyright and patent suggest that a general analysis
of "creators' welfare" might prove fruitful.' I save that for
another day or another scholar, however, and here make only
occasional references to patent policy.

II. PARALLELS BETWEEN WELFARE AND COPYRIGHT
Welfare and copyright share a number of material
similarities, summed up in Table 1, below. This Part discusses
each in order. Subpart II.A compares the primary and
secondary justifications of welfare and copyright, finding
striking parallels between the two. Subpart II.B gives the
direct and indirect beneficiaries of welfare and copyright like
treatment, to like effect. Subpart II.C relates the rights
redistributed by welfare to those redistributed by copyright,
while subpart II.D discovers parallels in how those two
statutory programs effectuate their redistributions. Subpart
II.E discusses some exceptions to the redistributions of welfare
and copyright, and subpart II.F discusses the protective
features of welfare and copyright. Each subpart finds notable
similarities between the two.

2 In other words, I assume that they will tend to continue regarding the
General Welfare Clause, U.S. CONST. pmbl., the Commerce Clause, id. art. I, § 3, and
the Necessary and Proper Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, as sufficient constitutional
authority for those programs.
see Bell, supra note 9, at 6-7.
23 For some preliminary comments in that vein,
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Table I: Notable Similarities Between Welfare and Copyright
Subject of Comparison
Primary justification
Secondary justification
Direct beneficiaries
Indirect beneficiaries
Redistributed rights
Source of rights
Rights granted
Redistribution mechanism
Protective alienation limits
Exceptions

A.

Welfare's
Version
Personal and
civil failure
Equitable
entitlement
The poor
Welfare service
providers
To taxable
wealth
Taxpayers
Money and
vouchers
Tax and welfare
system
Food stamps,
etc.
Exemptions,
deductions, etc.

Copyright's
Version
Market failure
Natural right
Authors
Owners and
distributors
To chattels and
persons
Property owners
Copyrights
Civil and
criminal suits
Termination and
moral rights
Fair use, first
sale, etc.

Justificationsof Welfare and Copyright

Welfare and copyright share both primary and
secondary justifications. As subsection I.A.1 explains, each of
their
primary
justifications
relies
on
utilitarian,
instrumentalist reasoning. Welfare aims to improve social wellbeing by helping the poor, whereas copyright aims to improve
social well-being by helping those who create expressive works.
Subsection II.A.2 discusses how welfare and copyright also rely
on similar secondary justifications based on deontological,
rights-based claims to certain benefits. Welfare protects the
human rights of the poor, on that minority view, whereas
copyright protects authors' natural rights. Although both
welfare and copyright enjoy some of the same procedural
protections afforded to natural or human rights, as section
II.A.3 explains,
that procedural
similarity speaks to
administration rather than justification.
The relationship between their leading and minority
justifications shows yet another parallel between welfare and
copyright: With regard to each, the United States stands nearly

AUTHORS' WELFARE

2003]

4
alone in favoring utilitarian over deontological justifications."
Other countries tend to reverse that order, favoring rightsbased claims to both welfare and copyright over utility-based
claims.25 Here as elsewhere, however, the analysis focuses on
U.S. law and policy.

1. Primary Justifications
In U.S. law and policy, welfare and copyright both rely
primarily on utilitarian justifications. Welfare in the United
26
States has never been granted as a matter of right. To the
contrary, and in sharp contrast with the welfare policies of
most other countries, U.S. welfare policy has required that
27
recipients demonstrate their need for public assistance.
Welfare, in that view, serves as an exception to the rule that
adults should take care of themselves, that families should
take care of their children, that voluntary communities should
take care of their members, and that public assistance should
28
offer no more than a bare safety net for the grievously fallen.
Welfare thus represents a political mechanism for maximizing
social utility by correcting failures in personal lives and nonpolitical institutions."
24

With regard to both, however, the U.S. can count other Anglo-Saxon

countries as fellow travelers in utilitarianism. See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSSEN, THE
THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 22-23, 26-27 (1990) (categorizing the U.S.,
Canada, and Australia together with regard to welfare). With regard to copyright, see,
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 26 (1994) (grouping the U.S., Britain, and
former British colonies together with regard to copyright).
25 See ESPING-ANDERSSEN, supra note 24 (contrasting the Anglo-Saxon
approach to welfare with two other general approaches, seen in other countries);
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 24, at 26 ("European, Asian, and Latin American nations have
copyright laws that... rest squarely on the natural rights philosophy ...").
26 Indeed, welfare in the U.S. has by definition come to signify means-tested
public assistance. KATZ, supra note 1, at ix-x.
27 See SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 223-24 (discussing rationale for New Deal
social programs); id. at 209-210 (discussing rationale for "War on Poverty" launched
during Johnson administration); ESPING-ANDERSSEN, supra note 24 (contrasting the
welfare policies of the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries with the welfare policies of
other countries); id. at 70 (showing the U.S. to have the highest ratio of means-tested
poor/general relief, the highest ratio of private/public health care spending, and the
lowest average benefit quality of all countries studied).
See KATZ, supra note 1, at x ("Social welfare expenses [in the U.S.]
consume a much smaller share of the Gross National Product than in other wealthy
nations, and ideological resistance to social welfare remains far more virulent.");
ESPING-ANDERSSEN, supra note 24, at 42 ("The general assumption in liberalism is
that the market is emancipatory . . . and poverty or helplessness is . . . solely a
consequence of an individual's lack of foresight and thrift.").
at 43 ("A means-tested assistance system is, in a sense, a way of
29 Id.
ensuring that non-market income is reserved for those who are unable to participate in
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Case law ' and commentary' likewise uniformly describe
copyright as a utilitarian device for maximizing social utility. 2
As the Supreme Court most recently put it, "[Clopyright law
serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to
pursue private ones."33 Specifically, copyright aims to alleviate
the market's failure to give adequate incentives for producing
expressive works." Absent that pressing need, copyright would
the market anyhow .... [Plublic obligation enters only where the market fails.").
30 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the
limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.");
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But
the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the ... public
good."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'")
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
31 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§1.03[A] (2002) (discussing the purpose of copyright); I PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §
1.13.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2003) ("utilitarianism [is] American copyright law's founding
premise. ... ").
:32 Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright's Mythology,
6 GREEN BAG 2D
37, 42 (2002) (describing as having become "dominant over the last half of the 20th
Century" the theory "that the primary purpose of copyright is not to enrich authors but
rather to give them an incentive to create works of authorship, which in turn increases
society's well-being.") (footnote omitted).
Nachbar goes on to argue that because the state copyright acts predating
the Constitution dated their protections from a work's publication rather than its
creation, they aimed not at encouraging authorship itself but rather at encouraging "an
independent American culture.., by the widest dissemination of American books .... "
Id. at 44. The first copyright act passed under the Constitution did not reflect that
philosophy, however, for the act extended protection to works "made and composed,
and not printed or published .... " Copyright Act of 1970, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1970)
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)). The 1790 Act did not condition protection
on the deposit of those works, id. § 3 (requiring deposit only of works "already printed
and published . . . ."), but rather only of their titles, id. § 1. In that respect, the 1790
Act demanded even less dissemination than the current Copyright Act. See Copyright
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A § 102(a) (West Supp. 2003) (conditioning copyright protection
not on dissemination but rather on fixation). Nachbar thus perhaps goes too far in
claiming, "[Tihe central place that creativity occupies in copyright is a feature of
modern copyright law." Nachbar, supra, at 44.
33 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 785
n.18 (2003).
'M1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, at § 1.03[A] ("[Tihe authorization to
grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright is predicated upon the
dual premises that the public benefits from the creative activities of authors, and that
the copyright monopoly is a necessary condition to the full realization of such creative
activities.") (footnotes omitted); I GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at § 1.14, at 1:40
("Copyright law presupposes that . . . authors and publishers will invest sufficient
resources in producing and distributing original works only if they are promised
property rights that will enable them to control and profit from their works'
dissemination in the marketplace.").
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have no justification at all, 5 a view supported by the history of
U.S. copyright law': and modern economic theory.:"
2. Secondary Justifications
Welfare and copyright alike sometimes win support
from appeals to natural law or human rights. That
deontological justification, though disfavored in U.S. law and
policy,:" still finds occasional use among theorists, lobbyists,
and lay people. Some philosophers, for instance, have defended
welfare as necessary to correct unchosen inequalities, such as
those arising solely from accidents of birth.' Others, in turn,
have defended copyright as necessary to secure authors'
natural rights." Lobbyists have employed deontological
arguments, albeit in less exalted phraseology, on behalf of
welfare4' and copyright 2 alike. Regardless, however, both

35 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, at § 1.03[A] ("[11n the absence of such
public benefit, the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals would be unjustified.")
(footnote omitted).
:6 See Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory
Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 762-74 (2001).
But see Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 529-39 (1990) (arguing that development of copyright law in the
U.S. reflects influence of natural rights).
"' See I GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at § 1.14.1; William Landes & Richard
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
38 Cf.supra Part II.A. 1 (describing primary justification).
generally Daniel Shapiro, Egalitarianism and Welfare-State
39 See

Redistribution, 19 SOC. PHIL. & POLY 1 (2002) (surveying justifications employed by
contemporary philosophical egalitarians).
40 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533 (1993);
Yen, supra note 36, at 517; Ayn Rand, Patents and Copyrights, in CAPITALISM: THE
UNKNOWN IDEAL 130 (1966). See also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual
Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287, 296-331 (1988) (exploring the uses and limits of the
Lockean justification of intellectual property).
41 See
Hearing on Welfare Reform Reauthorization Proposals:
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002), available at 2002 WL 820644 (F.D.C.H.)
(testimony of Pat Albright, member of Every Mother is a Working Mother) ("Under
welfare reform, mothers are not allowed at all to pursue a four-year college education.
This is a violation of our human rights.").
42 See Hearing on Online Entertainment and Copyright Law: Testimony
Senate Judiciary Committee to Protect Copyright Industries in the U.S.,
the
Before
107th Cong., 1st Sess., available at 2001 WL 323737 (F.D.C.H.) (testimony of Jack
Valenti, Chairman and CEO of Motion Picture Association) ("Creative property is
private property. To take it without permission and without payment collides with the
core values of this society.").
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welfare and copyright continue to rely predominately on
utilitarian justifications."
3. Theory vs. Practice
Subsections II.A.1 and II.A.2, above, speak only to the
common theoretical foundations of welfare and copyright - not
to how welfare and copyright work in practice. Granted, both
welfare and copyright incorporate procedural features
reminiscent of those used to protect human rights, corporeal
property, and other claims based on deontological justifications.
As a brief survey of the relevant law will illustrate, however,
that parallel speaks more to the administration of the welfare
and copyright systems than it does their theoretical
foundations.
The Supreme Court did not establish a fundamental
right to welfare when it mused, in Goldberg v. Kelly, "It may be
realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
'property' than a 'gratuity.'"" Rather, the Court held only that
welfare recipients had a due process right to receive
evidentiary hearings before their benefits were terminated."
Goldberg thus at most indicates that welfare benefits, like
copyrights, may share some of property's procedural features. 6
Because recent reforms to federal welfare law have specified
that it "shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or
family to assistance under any State program funded under
this par't," 7 welfare benefits arguably no longer enjoy even
those due process protections that Goldberg found attached to
entitlements."
43 See supra Part
II.A.1.

397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970).

41 Id. See also Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985)
(stating in dictum

that hearings determining eligibility for food stamps must meet same standard); Bd. of
Regents of State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (conjecturing that employee of
public university could have "property" interest in his employment sufficient to give
him due process rights, but holding that he had not shown that he was deprived of
liberty or property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
Welfare has never shared as many as copyright,
however. See infra Part
lIIIA.
47 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(b) (West Supp.
2003).
48 See Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We Know It,
49 STAN. L. REV. 471,
487 (1997) (review essay) (reviewing five texts) ("While Congress has abolished the
concept of 'entitlement' at the federal level, it is not yet clear what this will mean in
terms of poor people's ability to obtain due process when their benefits are
terminated.") (footnotes omitted); but see Carolyn Goodwin, Comment, "Welfare
Reform" and Procedural Due Process Protections: The Massachusetts Example, 48
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Regardless of how courts interpret the abolition of
federal entitlements, welfare will continue to fall far short of a
natural right. Procedural due process merely regulates access
to whatever benefits lawmakers choose to bestow; it does not
guarantee the benefits themselves. ." As recent reforms
demonstrate, lawmakers can cut welfare benefits without
triggering the kind of legal claims that would follow a
comparable attack on real or personal property rights.' Welfare
benefits thus exist not as a matter of right, but rather of
discretion.
As discussed below, copyright likewise shares many
functional traits with corporeal property." Even so, there
remain theoretical differences between copyright and
conventional types of property - differences that can have a
very practical impact.5" Copyright's utilitarian foundations thus
mark it, like welfare, as both theoretically and practically
different from corporeal property.
B.

Beneficiaries of Welfare and Copyright
1. Direct Beneficiaries

It would belabor the obvious to claim that social welfare
aims to directly benefit the deserving poor. Granted, skeptics
might object that in practice welfare harms the poor, or that
indirect beneficiaries have wormed their way into the welfare
system.' Even if true, however, those objections would not
change the fact that justifications of welfare rely on its
BUFF. L. REV. 565, 572-74 (2000) (arguing that due process protections continue to
apply at the state level).
'9 See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) ('[Tlhe analogy drawn in
Goldberg between social welfare and 'property,' cannot be stretched to impose a
constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the
law of entitlement to public benefits.") (citation omitted); Law, supra note 48, at 483
("[E]ntitlement signifies that individual poor people have a legal right to whatever
benefits Congress chooses to guarantee them.").
5 See Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 762
(1990) ("Welfare benefits are precarious and may be terminable by the state without
the consent of the recipient.") (footnote omitted).
5, See infra Part III.A.
52 See infra text accompanying notes 168-81.
r'3 See, e.g., DAVID KELLY, A LIFE OF ONE'S OWN: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE
WELFARE STATE 5-10 (1998) (describing perverse incentive effects of welfare). See also,
generally, CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980
(2nd ed., 1985).
'A See infra Part II.B.2.
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intention to distribute aid to the deserving poor,'2 and that
lawmakers have expressly adopted that distribution as one of
welfare's purposes.'
Lawmakers, 7 courts, ' and commentators have likewise
described authors as the direct beneficiaries of copyright. The
plain language of the Constitution fairly demands such
solicitude for authors."9 The Copyright Act effectuates that
demand by initially vesting the rights to a work in its author,'
who thereafter benefits from either exercising the rights
afforded by the Act' or transferring them to another party.2 As
with regard to welfare, none of this shows that copyright
always benefits authors in practice,' or that copyright benefits
no one other than authors. It shows only that copyright, like
welfare, targets a particular class of direct beneficiaries.
2. Indirect Beneficiaries
Welfare and copyright both have indirect beneficiaries.
These help themselves even as they help - or on some accounts,
hurt - the direct beneficiaries of those redistributive programs.
The indirect beneficiaries of the welfare system include
members of public' and private' organizations in the "poverty

56

See supra Part II.A. 1-2.

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003) (defining federal
welfare to have as one purpose to "provide assistance to needy families").
" See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, NOTES ON 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT,
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 140 (1976) (describing the author as "the fundamental
beneficiary of copyright").
m See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 26
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing authors as "the intended beneficiaries of the copyright
law").
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl.8 (empowering
congress to "secur[e] for limited
Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their.., writings").
See 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (West Supp. 2003).
61 See, e.g., id. §§ 106, 106A.
62 See id. § 201(d).
r See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 873, 884 (1997) (arguing that because courts routinely uphold employment
agreements that require employees to assign to their employers all works of authorship
made within the scope of employ, "the corporate employer (or publisher or producer),
not the ...author, is the primary beneficiary of copyright ...in most instances").
See Robert L. Woodson, Race and Economic Opportunity, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1017, 1025-27 (1989) (criticizing the broad scope and large scale of government services
designed to help the poor).
& See Stacey Y. Abrams, Note, Devolution's Discord: Resolving Operational
Dissonance with the UBIT, 17 YALE L. & POLY REV. 877, 883-85 (1999) (comparing the
size and role of private poverty services with government ones).
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services"" industry, such as administrators and social workers
in governmental or charitable organizations. The indirect
beneficiaries of welfare also include more obviously selfinterested parties, such as check cashing services, rent-to-own
stores, 7 and inner-city bodegas' that rely on their customers'
access to welfare services.
The copyright system likewise supports indirect
beneficiaries: publishers and distributors. As with welfare's
indirect beneficiaries, moreover, accounts vary as to whether
copyright's indirect beneficiaries help or hinder its ultimate
goal of promoting the public good. Courts' and commentators"'
generally portray publishers and distributors as deserving
recipients of copyright's benefits because those indirect
beneficiaries would, absent the incentives provided by
copyright, decline to provide crucial links between authors and
audiences. On a more skeptical view, publishers and
See Robert C. Ellickson, Monitoring the Mayor: Will the New Information
6
Technologies Make Local Officials More Responsible?, 32 URB. LAW. 391, 396 (2000)
(applying term to "specialists flush with good intentions" who "survive by obtaining
grants and contracts from a welter of government and foundation services," and
observing that they "would detest the label I just have pinned on them.").
67 See David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited: Antimarkets, Consumption,
and Empowerment, 66 BROoK. L. REV. 1, 4 n.8, 17 (2000) (characterizing check cashing
services and rent-to-own stores as reflective of "the marginalized commercial
environment and the profits available" in "ghetto antimarkets"); Anthony D. Taibi,
Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic
Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1463, 1510 (1994) (characterizing them as "profitable but marginal, under-regulated,
and exploitative institutions").
r' See David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket
Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 427, 473 (2000) (condemning "small neighborhood markets or
bodegas, where quality and selection are limited and prices are high") (footnote
omitted).
69 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating that copyright law
was "intended ... to grant a valuable, enforceable right to authors, publishers, etc., 'to
afford greater encouragement to the production of literary ... works of lasting benefit
to the world'") (quoting Washingtonian Co. v. Pearson, 396 U.S. 30, 36 (1939));
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir.
1996), ("[P]ublishers obviously need economic incentives to publish scholarly works,
even if the scholars do not need direct economic incentives to write such works.").
'0 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destructionof Copyright: Napster
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 279 (2002)
("Copyright . . . is designed not only to protect the author, but also to protect the
incentives of the publisher."); L. Ray Patterson, Nimmer's Copyright in the Dead Sea
Scrolls: A Comment, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 431, 441 (2001) ("[Clopyright is a monopoly that
encourages publishers to distribute works."); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L. J. 963, 970 (1990) ("According to a currently popular mode of analysis.., the
copyright system encourages authors to create and encourages distributors to purchase
rights in authors' creations so that the distributors may sell those creations to the rest
of us.").
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distributors have co-opted copyright policy and rigged the
system to receive more than their due." This is not the place to
debate the merits of contrasting accounts, however. Here, it
suffices to emphasize the parallels between the roles ascribed
to indirect beneficiaries in welfare policy and the roles ascribed
to indirect beneficiaries in copyright policy.
C.

Rights Redistributed by Welfare and Copyright

The welfare and copyright systems both operate by
redistributing rights. More specifically, both use statutory
mechanisms to redistribute personal property rights" from
members of the general public to particular beneficiaries.
Everyone knows that the welfare system works by taking fiat
money 3 from taxpayers, transferring it to political authorities,
and doling it out in the form of cash payments, food stamps,
housing vouchers, and so forth" - hence welfare's common
description as a "wealth redistribution ' .. or "transfer
payments"7 program. The claim that copyright likewise relies

See Ku, supra note 70, at 305 ("[Tlhe artificial scarcity and exclusive rights
created by copyright are not needed to encourage distribution."); Patterson, supra note
70, at 441 ("[Plublishers find it very convenient to use the author as the reason for
persuading Congress to continually enlarge and enhance the copyright monopoly.");
William Patry, The Failureof the American Copyright System: Protectingthe Idle Rich,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 909 (1997) ("United States copyright law has failed of its
essential purpose - to benefit authors - and is being shaped largely by powerful
distributors and their lobbyists ....); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights
in Computer-GeneratedWorks, 47 U. PITT.L. REV. 1185, 1227 n. 165 (1986) ("Although
the stated purpose of copyright is the compensation of authors, the reality is often that
the publishers reap the lion's share of the rewards.").
7
"Personal property" here, as usual, means all property other than real
estate. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (6th ed., 1990). All personal property is either
incorporeal or corporeal. Id.
73 So-called because it is not backed by gold or silver,
but rather by State's
power. See id. at 623 (defining "fiat money").
71 See Peter Flora & Arnold J. Heidenheimer,
The Historical Core and
Changing Boundaries of the Welfare State, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF WELFARE STATES
IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 17, 25-26 (Peter Flora & Arnold J. Heidenheimer eds., 1981)
(describing basic means by which welfare states pursue their goals).
You might say, given the changes wrought by such redistributions, that the
welfare system converts one type of incorporeal personal property into other types of
incorporeal property. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 72, at 1271 (defining
"incorporeal personal property").
7r See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 50, at 760 ("[W]elfare benefits... arise out of
a conscious scheme of income support and wealth distribution...
78 See, e.g., id. at 760-61 ("Welfare benefits are transfer
payments that rely
on the taxes imposed upon some in order to provide the benefits that are received by
others.").
7
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on the redistribution of rights requires some explanation,
however.
The Copyright Act grants to the owner of each
copyrighted work the exclusive right to reproduce the work,77
prepare derivative works based on it,78 and distribute copies of
the work to the public. In addition, the owner of a particular
type of work may win the exclusive right to publicly perform'
or display it.' The Act limits those rights through various
ways,' most notably through the fair use' and first sale'
doctrines. Nonetheless, the Act gives a copyright owner very
broad rights - and very broad power to enforce those rights.'
A copyright owner's rights do not come out of thin air.
They come only at the expense of someone else's common law
rights.' When, for instance, a novelist wields his copyright to
forbid the unauthorized reproduction of his book, he
necessarily limits the right of a printer to quietly enjoy her ink,
press, and paper. 7 Copyright interferes not only with such
77 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (West Supp. 2003).
78

Id. § 106(2).

79 Id. § 106(3).

o Id. § 106(4) (pertaining to public performance of literary, musical, dramatic
and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures or other audiovisual
works); id. § 106(6) (pertaining to public performance of sound recordings by means of
digital audio transmissions).
" Id. § 106(5) (pertaining to public display of literary, musical, dramatic and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work). See also id.
§ 106A (providing attribution and integrity rights to the authors of works of visual art).
82 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-122 (West Supp.
2003).
8" Id. § 107.
8' Id. § 109.
8S See infra Part II.D.
See Randy E. Barnett, Reds in Suits, REGULATION, Oct. 1, 2002, at 64-65
(reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2001)) (explaining that because of copyright, "the property owner
cannot fully use what he reasonably thought was his"); Bell supra note 36, at 763 ("[Bly
invoking government power a copyright owner can impose prior restraint, fines,
imprisonment, and confiscation on those engaged in peaceful expression and the quiet
enjoyment of physical property.") (footnote omitted).
87 Professor John Cahir of the Queen Mary Intellectual
Property Research
Institute, University of London, has objected that simply because copyright imposes
such limits on the use of corporeal property does not mean that copyright redistributes
rights. Email from John Cahir to Tom W. Bell (July 25, 2003) (on file with the author).
As Professor Cahir correctly observed, a copyright owner cannot force others to
reproduce her works; she can only stop them from using their corporeal property in
copyright-infringing ways. Instead of proving that copyright redistributes no rights,
however, that observation proves that copyright redistributes partial rights. A
copyright owner wins something like joint ownership in one of the many rights enjoyed
by owners of corporeal property - namely, the right to use corporeal property in certain
copyright-controlled ways. Neither the owner of the copyright nor the owner of the
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chattel property rights, but also with corporeal personal
property rights' in general and with the rights each person has
over herself' in particular. When a composer asserts her
copyright to bar the unauthorized public performance of her
song, for instance, she necessarily limits the rights of a singer
to use his vocal chords, to express himself, and to peaceably
associate with others.'
Granted, the redistributions effectuated by the welfare
and copyright systems do not always raise the ire, or even
attract the attention of those from whom they take property.
Most taxpayers and property owners have grown accustomed to
the costs imposed by welfare and copyright, and thus take
corporeal property has the right to unilaterally appropriate that jointly owned right.
See, e.g., 20 AM. JUR. 2D Cotenancy and Joint Ownership §§ 42, 45 (2003). Copyright
splits that right, formerly possessed solely by each owner of corporeal property, and
redistributes part of it to copyright owners.
A similar analysis applies to the redistributions effectuated by the social
welfare system. As discussed infra at Part II.D, the exactions that support welfare, like
those that support copyright, take effect only conditionally. Just as welfare relies on
someone to engage in a taxable transaction, in other words, copyright relies on
someone to engage in a potentially infringing act. And just as we might say that
copyright's redistributions create joint ownership in the right to use corporeal property
in certain ways, we might say that welfare's redistributions create joint ownership in
the right to earn income or engage in certain other transactions. One might object that
once social welfare system's redistributive mechanism takes effect, it obtains absolute
rights to the fiat money formerly owned by a subject taxpayer. But, again, the same in
general holds true of the licenses obtained by copyright owners. By default, the owner
of corporeal property constrained by a copyright license has no right to control
subsequent assignment of that license. In sum, then, the parallels between copyright
and welfare remain even if we focus on the partial nature of their redistributions.
Corporeal personal property includes moveable and tangible things such as
chattel property, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 72, at 1217, and,
presumably, property in persons.
89 Modern legal commentators do not tend to discuss persons as subject
to
property claims, no doubt for the salubrious reason that the Thirteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution forbids private parties from practicing slavery and involuntary
servitude. It does not, however, forbid anyone from claiming a property right in him- or
herself. Indeed, the liberty rights protected by the U.S. Constitution and other laws
serve to ensure that each of us enjoys a variety of rights to dispose of our persons as we
each, respectively, see fit. We thus have property rights over our persons. See RANDY E.
BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 64 (1998) ([R]ights that concern jurisdiction
over physical resources are called property rights. Since our bodies are physical entities
or resources they are included in the term."); John Locke, The Second Treatise of
Government, in JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ch. v, para. 27 (P.
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed., 1960) (1689) ("[Elvery Man has a Property
in his own Person.") (emphasis in the original).
90 See Tom W. Bell, The Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1746,
1763 (1999) (arguing that "[clopyright undeniably limits our rights to use our printing
presses or voices in echo of others' or to contract toward similar ends.") (footnote
omitted); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-PosnerianLaw and Economics
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 281 (1989) ("[A] system of intellectual property
rights is not compossible with a system of property rights to tangible objects, especially
one's own body, the foundation of the right to property in alienable objects.").
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offense only when taxes rise or copyrights expand. Automatic
withholding ensures that many taxpayers fail to consider the
entirety of their paychecks as their own, furthermore, just as
many who own property never consider using it to violate
copyrights." But those caveats speak to the practical and
ethical limits of redistribution, not to its operative
mechanisms. It remains true that, functionally speaking, both
welfare and copyright rely on the statutory redistribution of
rights to property.'
D.

RedistributiveMechanisms of Welfare and Copyright

Both welfare and copyright have mechanisms for
redistributing rights from one group to another. For welfare,
the U.S. tax system redistributes wealth from taxpayers to the
federal government 3 by forcing those within its scope' to
liquidate some of the value of their taxable assets and transfer
it to the U.S. treasury." The federal income tax' accounts for
the bulk of such transfers;9 7 excise taxes' together with gift and
estate99 taxes contribute only a fraction as much. Through all
9' See Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 181, 190-93 (2003) (applying a similar analysis to explain the interest
group asymmetries that affect the definition of property rights).
92 We might even, per Lord Macaulay's famous characterization of
copyright
as a "tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers," Macaulay, supra
note 11, say that both welfare and copyright rely on taxes, albeit of different types.
93 See generally, Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-9833 (West Supp.
2002); Treasury Regulations for I.R.C., 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.0-1 to 801.6 (2003).
See Richard Lavoie, A World of Taxpayers? It's Not a Small World After
All, 70 UMKC L. REV. 545 (2002) (describing extraterritorial reach of U.S. tax law);
Kenneth D. Heath, The Symmetries of Citizenship: Welfare, Expatriate Taxation, and
Stakeholding, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 533, 545 (1999) (discussing reach of U.S. taxes with
regard to U.S. citizens, resident aliens, expatriated U.S. citizens, and nonresident
aliens).
95 See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-1564 (West Supp.
2003)
(income taxes); id. §§ 2001-2704 (2002) (estate and gift taxes); id. §§ 4001-5000
(miscellaneous excise taxes); id. §§ 5001-5881 (alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise
taxes).
96 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, Historical Table 2.2 (Feb. 3, 2003) (documenting
that receipts from individual income taxes constituted 46.3%, and corporate income
taxes 8.0%, of federal receipts in 2002, the most recent year for which firm figures were
available).
97 By "such transfers" I mean to exclude federal receipts from social
insurance and retirement payments, because the federal government in theory (if not
practice) dedicates those payments to those programs alone.
9' See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 96, at Historical
Table 2.2. (documenting that excise taxes constituted 3.6% of federal receipts in 2002).
99 See id. at Historical Table 2.1, 2.5 (documenting that excise taxes
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those means, and subject to a bewildering variety of conditions,
private parties' taxable assets thus become the State's fiat
money." Some of that money, together with money from states'
tax systems, thereafter funds social welfare programs and
benefits. '
Likewise, the U.S. copyright system redistributes rights
from owners of corporeal personal property - which is to say,
everyone' 2 - to owners of copyrights. The copyright system does
so by empowering copyright owners, through civil lawsuits, to
force others to respect their statutory rights.' 3 Copyright
owners enjoy broad remedies of those rights, including
injunctions,' the impounding of infringing articles and devices
used in infringement,' 5 statutory damages or actual damages
and profits,'" costs and attorneys fees,' 7 and bars on the
importation of infringing articles.'0 They also enjoy having
prosecutors combat infringement through criminal suits.'"
Through all these means, copyright owners effectively arrogate
to themselves rights that would otherwise remain the province
of others. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, copyright
"restrains the spontaneity of men where but for it there would
be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit.""0

contributed $28,400 million in receipts to the federal government in 2002, which works
out to 1.4% of the total receipts of 1,853,173 million).
'oo See generally Sheldon D. Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the
Illusions of Tax Simplification, 2 GEO. MASON IND. L. REV. 319 (1994); James S. Eustic,
Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner,45 TAX L. REV. 7 (1989).
'o' See PRWORA, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (authorizing, subject to a variety of conditions, block
grants of federal funds to states' welfare programs).
102 Because, at a minimum, each person owns his or her self. See supra note
89.
10'

See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (West Supp. 2003) ("Anyone who violates any of

the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.., is an infringer. . . .); id. § 501(b) ("The
legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to
institute an action for any infringement of that particular right ...
'0' Id. § 502.
105 Id.
§ 503. See also id. § 506(b) (providing similar remedies in criminal
cases).

. Id. § 504.
Id. § 505.
'o8 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-03 (West Supp. 2003).
'09 See id. §§ 506, 509; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2319 (West Supp. 2003).
"o White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes,
107

J., concurring).
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Exceptions to Redistribution by Welfare and Copyright

The welfare system and the copyright system each
include exceptions designed to avoid inefficient or inequitable
redistributions of rights. When those exceptions apply, they
spare taxpayers from having their wealth transferred to
welfare recipients, and they spare owners of corporeal property
from having their rights transferred to copyright owners. This
subpart compares how such exceptions function in the welfare
system with how they function in the copyright system,
revealing telling similarities between the two.
Because by far the bulk of federal receipts supporting
welfare comes from income taxes,"' the various tax exemptions,
deductions, and credits of the U.S. income tax code offer
especially apt examples of exceptions to the welfare system's
redistributive effects. The tax code exempts from income taxes
a broad range of charitable, educational, mutual benefit, and
religious institutions."-2 Lawmakers have never plainly
expressed their reasons for granting tax-exempt status to such
organizations, however."3 Commentators have consequently
filled that vacuum with various explanations, all of which rely
in some form or another on the claim that through tax
exemption the federal government subsidizes private
institutions that advance worthy social policy goals, especially
4
those policy goals that might otherwise go unfulfilled.1
Relatedly, taxpayers may deduct from their reported income
gifts they make to certain tax-exempt organizations."
Legislative history justifies those deductions on the grounds
that such contributions promote ends that the government
would otherwise have to promote at its own expense."'
Additionally, the income tax system allows personal and
dependent exemptions"7 that, commentators agree, help to
ensure that all but the wealthiest households will be allowed to
retain a certain amount of income to meet such basic needs as

.. See supra Part IID.
112 See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-30 (West Supp. 2003).
1
Kevin M. Yamamoto, Taxing Income from the Mailing List and Affinity
CardArrangements: A Proposal,38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 231 (2001).
14 See id. at 231-46 (classing extant theories
into three general groups and
offering summaries of their tenets).
115 26 U.S.C.A. § 170 (West
Supp. 2003).
116H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938), reprintedin 1939-1 C.B. 728.
117 26 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West Supp. 2003).
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food, shelter, and housing."' Many tax credits - most notably,
the earned income credit ' - likewise serve to guarantee that
income taxes do not take away what the welfare system would
have to replace.'20
Just as exceptions to the income tax aim at increasing
the equity and efficiency of the social welfare system,
exceptions to the scope of infringement aim at fine-tuning the
copyright system. The most notable of copyright's broad
exceptions, the fair use defense, satisfies both basic notions of
fairness 2 ' and theoretical principles of efficiency.'22 The first
sale doctrine, another prominent and general exception to
copyright's scope, likewise bars otherwise unjust or wasteful
The Copyright Act also includes a
infringement claims.'
variety of exceptions specifically designed to help the same
sorts of parties favored by exceptions to the income tax.'24
Parties sheltered from the full brunt of copyright include:
blind, handicapped, or disabled persons;'25 nonprofit educational
institutions;'26 religious organizations;'27 and other nonprofit
8

groups. 12
"8

See BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

OF INDIVIDUALS 21-1 (2nd ed., 1995 & 2002 Supp.).
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 32 (West Supp. 2003).
120 See generally id. §§ 21-26 (defining a variety of nonrefundable
personal
credits); JAMES E. MAULE, ET AL., TAX CREDITS: CONCEPTS AND CALCULATION A-11

(2002) (describing credits not based on expenditures or outlays, such as earned income
credit and the elderly or disabled credit, as "devices to affect the computation of tax
liability in situations in which changes in the rate structures would not accomplish...
policy goals").
"' See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 57, at 124 (1976)
(explaining that "the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason").
122See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1601 (1982) ("[C]ourts and Congress have employed fair use to permit uncompensated
transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through the
market.").
'2 See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378,
1388 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (explaining that the first sale doctrine arises out of "policies
disfavoring restraints of trade and limitations on the alienation of personal property").
124For analogous provisions in the income tax code, see, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 22
(West Supp. 2003) (providing tax credits for permanently and totally disabled persons);
id. §§ 501-39 (providing tax exemption for certain organizations).
125See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(8)-(9) (excusing certain performances specifically
designed for and directed to blind or other handicapped persons); id. § 121 (excusing
certain reproductions or distributions of nondramatic literary works for use by blind or
other disabled persons).
126 See id.
§ 110(1) (West Supp. 2003) (excusing certain performances or
displays by nonprofit educational institutions). See also id. § 107(1) (referring to
"nonprofit educational purposes" in defining the scope of the fair use defense); id. § 108
(excusing certain reproductions by libraries or archives).
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In sum, then, welfare and copyright show a sensitivity
to the potentially harmful effects of indiscriminately
redistributing rights. With the apparent aim of promoting
efficiency and equity, the welfare and copyright systems both
include exceptions to the redistributions they normally exact.
Those exceptions work to the benefit of taxpayers and owners
of corporeal property, respectively, protecting them in certain
cases from having their rights redistributed away.
F.

Protective Featuresof Welfare and Copyright

Welfare policy obviously exhibits many paternalistic
features, such as programs designed to encourage job training
or employment,129 and vouchers good only for housing or food.'3 °
Copyright policy exhibits several such features, too. Like
welfare, copyright thereby aims to protect its beneficiaries from
childishly succumbing to adult temptations. Because they are
not so obvious as welfare's, however, copyright's protective
features merit some description.
Most notably, § 203, § 304(c), and § 304(d) of the
Copyright Act allow authors' to terminate copyright rights
they have granted to others. Those termination rights come
with strings attached, however.' 2 The rights last for only five
...See id. § 110(3) (excusing certain performances or displays "in the course of
services at a place of worship or other religious assembly").
"2 See id. § 110(6) (excusing certain performances by nonprofit agricultural
groups); id. § 110(10) (excusing certain performances by nonprofit veterans' or fraternal
organizations).
"9 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003) (defining federal welfare to
have as one purpose to "end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits
by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage").
130 See infra text accompanying note 156 (discussing limited alienability of
welfare benefits).
131 They also allow certain members of dead authors' estates to exercise
termination rights. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(1)-(2); id. § 304(c)-(d) (referencing parties
defined in § 304(a)(1)(C)).
132 See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Looking Ahead and Shaping the Future:
Provoking Change in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 549, 578-79 (2001)
(describing scope and limits of reversionary right). Crews explains some aspects of the
reversionary right as a "response to a public policy of favoring family members and
heirs over an author's freedom of contract." Id. at 579. He does not claim that as the
sole justification for the termination right, however, most aspects of which living
authors can enjoy. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(1) (West Supp. 2003) ("[T]ermination ...
may be effected by [the] author . . . ."); id. § 203(b)(1) ('Upon the effective date of
termination, all rights under this title that were covered by the terminated grants
revert to the author, authors, or other persons owning termination interests . . . ."); id.
§ 304(c)-(d) (granting right to parties defined in § 304(a)(1)(C), including, inter alia,
"the author").
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years,'" do not arise before thirty-five years after the grant,'"
and require the reclaiming owner or owners to give prior
notice. 39 Nonetheless, termination rights remain powerful and,
compared to the law's typical respect for voluntary transfers of
rights,'36 somewhat exceptional. Sections 203, 304(c), and 304(d)
neither respect any agreement to the contrary'37 nor require
terminators to compensate losing grantees.'"
What justifies the Act's disregard for authors' initial
grants over thirty-five years old? Legislative history"' and
commentary " ' answer that the termination rights aim to
133

See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(3), 304(c)(3), 304(d)(2) (West Supp. 2003).

Id. § 203(a)(3) (providing that termination may take effect between 35 to
40 years after the grant); id. § 304(c)(1), (3) (providing that termination rights apply
only to grants made before January 1, 1978 and that termination can take effect only
after the later of that date or 56 years from when the copyright was originally secured,
thus setting a lower bound of 56 years on the length of the pre-termination grant). The
termination rights afforded by § 304(d), because they arise only if the rights under §
304(c) have expired, necessarily allow an even longer pre-termination grant.
"' Id. §§ 203(a)(4), 304(c)(4) (describing form and timing of notice of
termination); § 304(d)(1) (incorporating the conditions of § 304(c)(4) by reference).
136 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 208 (1979) (describing
comparatively narrow conditions under which a court might refuse to enforce a
contract on grounds of unconscionability and relatively constrained termination of
rights effectuated in such cases).
137 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (West Supp.
2003) ("Termination ...
may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an
agreement to make a will or to make any future grant."); id. § 304(d)(1) (incorporating
the conditions of § 304(c)(5) by reference). But see id. §§ 203(b)(4), § 304(c)(6)(D),
304(d)(1) (allowing for enforceability of post-termination grant or of agreement to make
such a grant if such grant or agreement occurs between certain parties and after
proper notice of termination has been given).
1
Sections 203, 304(c), and 304(d) do not speak to the requirement to make
compensation, pro or con. No authority has found such a requirement, however, and
those provisions of the Act apparently assume that terminating owners take nothing
because, as the Act defines copyright, they give nothing. Query, though, whether a
terminatee might on the proper facts have a claim for promissory estoppel, mistake, or
fraud against a terminator.
139 See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, NOTES ON
1976 COPYRIGHT ACT,
supra note 57, at 124 (1976) ("A provision of this sort [i.e., § 203] is needed because of
the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of
determining a work's value until it has been exploited."). The same justification clearly
applies to §§ 304(c) and 304(d), which Congress enacted in order to ensure that
copyright extensions would retroactively benefit extant owners of copyrights. See id. at
140 (justifying § 304's provision of termination rights on grounds that "the extended
term represents a completely new property right, and there are strong reasons for
giving the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of copyright under the
Constitution, an opportunity to share in it").
140 Robert A. Kreiss, Abandoning Copyrights to Try to Cut Off Termination
Rights, 58 Mo. L. REV. 85, 109 (1993) (explaining that termination rights "are designed
to redress the likely imbalance in bargaining strength between copyright authors and
publishers or other copyright grantees"); J. H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law:
A Realist's Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 947 (1991)
(reviewing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1989))
4
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correct the sorts of bad bargains that struggling authors make
in desperation and, after later success, come to regret.
Termination rights reflect, in other words, a paternalistic view
of authors. Authors need termination rights so they can secondguess their choices, thus correcting the market's failure to
foresee and fairly price the future value of long-term grants.
The now-famous Stephen King, for instance, can thereby
renegotiate a publishing contract he rashly accepted as a
credulous and eager novice. '
Copyright policy reveals a similar protective strategy in
two other areas, albeit via mechanisms that also serve
significant non-paternalist ends. First, § 204(a) of the Act
renders invalid any voluntary transfer of copyright unless the
copyright owner or agent signs a writing memorializing the
transfer. "2 Because ownership in a copyright by default inheres
in its author,'4' that provision protects authors from casually
giving away their copyrights."' Because granting an exclusive
license to any right created by the Act qualifies as a transfer of
ownership,'45 moreover, § 204(a)'s demand for a signed writing
extends even to a transfer as narrow as, say, the sole right to
publicly display a sculpture in San Clemente, California, from
dawn to dusk on February 3, 2003.4' This, the Act's counterpart
(describing right to terminate transfers as "paternalistic"); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use
as Market Failure:A StructuralAnd Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its
Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1619, n.113 (1982) (arguing that in its provision
of termination rights "Congress has shown special solicitude for the welfare of
individual authors, even as opposed to publishers and other potential owners of
copyright").
1
We might well question whether termination rights in fact help an author.
In fact, they probably harm most authors and help only those who least need help. See
Bell, supra note 36, at 794-95, n. 273. We might likewise question the practical impact
of some of welfare's paternalistic features. Regardless of whether those good intentions
pave roads to ruin, however, copyright and welfare each try to protect their
beneficiaries by limiting how freely they can dispose of their benefits.
142 17 U.S.C.A. § 204(a) (West Supp. 2003) (invalidating
any transfer, other
than by law, absent a memorial "in writing and signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent").
141 Id.
§ 201(a) (West Supp. 2003) ("Copyright... vests initially in the author
or authors of the work.").
144 It protects subsequent, non-author owners,
too, of course.
145 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 201(d)(1), (2)
(West Supp. 2003).
146 See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarmet Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36-37
(2d Cir. 1982) (holding that licensee holding exclusive right to reproduce and publicly
distribute copyrighted images on adult clothing, for a specified time, in North America,
may have standing to sue for infringement of that right); Swarovski America Ltd. v.
Silver Deer Ltd., 537 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-06 (D. Colo. 1982) (declining to dismiss
copyright infringement claim by party claiming exclusive license to reproduce and
publicly distribute copyrighted work in a particular area for a particular time).
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to the statute of frauds, protects authors from all manner of
misjudgments and swindles, from the gross to the trifling. "7
Second, § 106A of the Act offers special protections to
any author of a "work of visual art.". 8 The Act defines that
term, in essence, as a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or
exhibition photograph existing in a single copy or a limited
edition of two hundred or fewer copies "9 - the fine visual arts,
in other words. Section 106A not only gives the authors of such
works special rights," it gives those authors special protections
from losing their § 106A rights in the marketplace. True, the
author of a work of visual art can waive his § 106A rights
(albeit even then only by expressly agreeing to do so in a
written instrument he has signed).'"' Notably, however, he
cannot transfer his § 106A rights.' 2 However much a starving
artist might like to trade his § 106A rights for cash, in other
words, the Act will forbid the exchange as short sighted,
denigrating, and ultimately not in the artist's best interests.''
Through a variety of mechanisms, therefore, copyright
law protects its beneficiaries from the harsh realities of the real
world. Perhaps those mechanisms - termination rights,
requirements for written transfers of exclusive rights, and
limits on the alienability of rights to works of visual art - do
not imbue copyright policy with the same depth of paternalism
that marks welfare policy. Nonetheless, copyright's tender
concern for authors shows that it, like welfare, aims to not only
redistribute rights, but to make them stick.
17 Like the statute of frauds, § 204(a)
serves other goals too, such as the
assurance that courts will have quality evidence to adjudicate disputed agreements.
148 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (West Supp. 2003).

"9 Id. § 101. A few other qualifications apply, such as the requirement that
any limited edition work be signed and consecutively numbered by the author, and
several exclusions, such as those applicable to posters, maps, merchandising items,
works made for hire, or works not subject to copyright protection. Id.
'50 Such as, for instance, the right to claim
authorship in the work, id. §
106A(a)(1)(A), and prevent any intentional modification of the work that would be
prejudicial to his or her reputation, id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
"' Id. § 106A(e)(1).
152

Id.

'" See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6928 (stating that "these rights are personal to the author and that, because of a
relatively weak economic position, the author may be required to bargain away those
rights"); Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and
Analysis, 67 WASH. L. REV. 827, 848 (1992) ("[Tjhe inevitable conclusion to be drawn
from the Act's prohibition on the transfer of section 106A rights is that Congress
sought to protect artists. Apparently, Congress was trying to rectify an imbalance of
bargaining power between artists and buyers.").
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III. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN WELFARE AND COPYRIGHT

Welfare and copyright differ, of course. Indeed, every
parallel that Part II plotted between the two also revealed
divergences. Even granting that both welfare and copyright
redistribute rights, for instance, they still redistribute different
kinds of rights. 54 Some of the distinctions between welfare and
copyright merit more attention than others, however. This Part
discusses the most important distinctions, those that either
argue against the authors' welfare analogy or that reveal
interesting things about copyright. Table 2 below sums them
up.
Table 2: Material Dissimilarities Between Welfare and Copyright
Subject of
Comparison

Welfare's Version

Copyright's Version

Property-like

Due process rights

features

only

Several

Claimant's status
Externalities

Deserving poor
Negative and

targeted

positive

Curing growth

Wealth (and

Population (and

population)

wealth)

Starving aitists
Positive only

Of all the distinctions between welfare and copyright,
the former's relative lack of property-like features argues most
strongly against the claim that welfare and copyright share
illuminating similarities. Copyright, in brief, looks a lot more
like property than welfare does. Subpart III.A addresses that
distinction, observing that neither welfare nor copyright
equates to property and, thus, that their many striking
parallels remain instructive. Subpart III.B analyzes another
dissimilarity that threatens to undermine the authors' welfare
analogy: the difference between the most sympathetic
recipients of welfare, the deserving poor, and the most
sympathetic recipients of copyright, starving artists. Although
both types of beneficiaries can make convincing appeals to
public assistance, the latter, on most views, makes a stronger
claim of right. As subpart III.B argues, however, that stronger

'" See supra Part II.C (explaining that whereas welfare redistributes rights
to money, copyright redistributes rights to chattels and persons).
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claim of right does not necessarily give copyright a stronger
claim on our consciences.
The remaining two dissimilarities between welfare and
copyright discussed in this Part do not so much speak against
the authors' welfare model as they say interesting things about
copyright. Subpart III.C compares the particular sorts of
failures that welfare and copyright aim to remedy, finding that
although both aim to generate positive externalities, only
welfare focuses on decreasing negative externalities. Subpart
III.D contrasts how we might outgrow the need for welfare
with how we might outgrow the need for copyright. All else
being equal, economic growth tends to mitigate poverty,
whereas population growth tends to render copyright
superfluous.
A.

Property-likeFeatures

As discussed above, welfare benefits have been awarded
the same due process protections awarded to property in
general.'5 Beyond that, however, welfare possesses few
property-like features. Would-be welfare recipients cannot
homestead their rights, but rather must apply for them. Nor
does the law allow welfare benefits to be divided, transferred,
mortgaged, or bequeathed."
Copyright, in contrast, bears many marks of property.
Owners of copyright rights can homestead them,'7 record
them," transfer them,'5 bequeath them,"u subdivide them, '
'5 See supra Part II.A.3.

15 See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment
Immunity?, 106
YALE L.J. 1683, 1752 (1997) (describing right to continued welfare payments as a "notfreely-alienable"); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to
Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 286 (1995) ("[Tlhe welfare state restricts the
alienation of welfare benefits - in effect, by making them illiquid, discouraging their
use for idiosyncratic purposes."). Just as states generally disburse welfare benefits, so
too do they regulate the alienability of those benefits. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 11002 (West 2001) ("All aid given under a public assistance program shall be
absolutely inalienable by any assignment, sale, or otherwise.").
157 In other words, they can create copyright rights by mixing their
authorship
with a tangible medium of expression. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 8 (empowering
Congress to secure for authors temporary exclusive rights to their expressions); 17
U.S.C.A. § 120(a) (West Supp. 2003) (giving copyright protections to "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . ."); 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a)
(West Supp. 2003) (providing that copyright "vests initially in the author or authors of
a work").
'. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 205 (West Supp. 2003) (providing
for recordation of
"[any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright");
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mortgage them, 6 ' and abandon them." The Copyright Act
makes infringement a strict liability offense, " moreover, and
regulates transfers of rights with something quite like the
Statute of Frauds rule applicable to real property transfers." It
looks increasingly likely that copyright even qualifies as
"property" covered by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
clause. ' Lawyers thus classify copyright as a type of
intellectual property for good reason."7
Nonetheless, copyright does not bear all the marks of
corporeal property. Copyright possesses certain characteristics,
69 and reliance on
such as duration caps," limited alienability,"
administrative formalities, 7 ' that the common law generally
id. § 408(a) (providing for registration of copyrights).
159 Id. § 201(d)(1) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole
or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law....").
'6o Id. ("The ownership of a copyright... may be bequeathed by will or pass as
personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.").
§ 201(d)(2) ("Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright,
161 Id.
including any subdivision of any rights... may be... owned separately.").
'6 See id. § 101 (defining "transfer of copyright ownership" to include a
mortgage); id. § 201(d)(1)-(2).
16 Although there exists no plain statutory allowance for the abandonment of
a copyright, commentators agree it is possible even as they disagree about its
operation. Compare Bell, supra note 36, at 793-95 (arguing that Copyright Act's
termination provisions should not limit effectiveness of copyright abandonment) with
Kreiss, supra note 140, at 111-23 (arguing that they should).
164 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner ... is an infringer .... "); id. § 504(c)(2) (providing that where
the copyright owner elects for statutory damages and the court finds the infringer
acted innocently, "the court in its discretion may reduced the award of statutory
damages to a sum of not less than $200"); id. § 405(b) (denying actual or statutory
damages for infringement of work publicly distributed before the effective date of the
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 without a copyright notice if the
infringer can prove he or she was thereby misled as to the work's ownership).
'6 See id. § 204(a) (invalidating most transfers of copyright ownership "unless
an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing
and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed").
166 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that patents qualify as property under the 14th
Amendment's Due Process Clause, rendering them protectable against states
notwithstanding states' sovereign immunity); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d
601, 605 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) (extending the reasoning of FloridaPrepaid to copyrights).
I thank Richard H. Stern for a stirring discussion of this issue.
17 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 24, at 8-9 (discussing the merits
to and limits of
the "intellectual property" label).
168 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 302-05 (West Supp. 2003).
1'9 Id. § 203(a)(5) (denying enforceability of any agreement to limit the
termination rights described in § 203); id. § 106A(e)(1) (denying transferability of
rights described in § 106A(a)).
170 Id.
§ 412(a) (requiring registration prior to legal action for copyright
infringement); id. § 413 (denying certain remedies for pre-registration infringements of
a copyright).
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does not impose on the property rights that it respects.'71
Despite rhetoric to the contrary,'72 moreover, unauthorized use
of a copyrighted work does not equate to infringement,'73 and
infringement does not equate to theft."' As the Supreme Court
said, in excusing the transport of bootleg records from criminal
sanctions applicable to traffic in stolen or converted goods, "The
copyright owner . . . holds no ordinary chattel . . . for the
copyright holder's dominion is subjected to precisely defined
limits. It follows that interference with copyright does not
easily equate with theft, conversion, or fraud."'' Copyright thus
does not function in quite the way that corporeal property does.
More to the point, copyright differs theoretically from
property as we generally understand it. Copyright rights have
no foundation in common law.'76 To the contrary, copyright
rights arise solely by modifying or negating pre-existing,
77
rights to persons and chattel property.'
customary
Furthermore, copyright affects that redistribution through
statutory mechanisms, making it subject to public choice
distortions.'78 The scope and duration of copyright has thus
expanded relatively rapidly under U.S. law,' 7 in sharp contrast
See also, 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, at §4.03, at 4-18
to 4-19
(discussing the rationale for the doctrine that publication divests common law rights in
expressive works).
172 Lemley, supra note 63, at 895 ("[Tlhe rhetoric
and economic theory of real
property are increasingly dominating the discourse and conclusions of the very
different world of intellectual property.").
113 See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 107-122 (West Supp. 2003)
(describing a wide variety of
limits on the exclusive rights afforded under the Copyright Act).
174 See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S.
207, 218 (1985) ("While one may
colloquially liken infringement with some general notion of wrongful appropriation,
infringement plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests than does runof-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud."); Lemley, supra note 63, at 896 ("Intellectual
property cases and arguments are replete with references to infringement as 'theft,'
which it assuredly is not, at least in the traditional meaning of that word.") (footnote
omitted). I thank Prof. Howard P. Knopf for reminding me of this particular limitation
on copyright-as-property rhetoric.
175 Dowling, 473 U.S. at 216-17 (1985) (finding interstate
transport of bootleg
records not subject to criminal sanctions under law forbidding interstate commerce in
stolen goods).
176 See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S.
1, 19 (1908)
(Holmes, J., concurring) (contrasting common law rights with copyright and describing
it as "a right which could not be recognized or endured for more than a limited time,
and therefore ... one which hardly can be conceived except as a product of statute, as
the authorities now agree").
177 See L. Ray Patterson, Copyright and the "Exclusive
Right" of Authors, 1 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 22 (1993) ("Copyright is an intrusion upon the common-law public
domain."). See also supra Part II.C.
178 See Bell, supra note 36, at
786-87.
179 Id. at 780-86.
171
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to our relatively stable, customary, and intuitive rights to
persons and property."n Most fundamentally, the nonrivalrous
nature of copyright's intangible subject matter - expressive
works - renders it a wholly different beast from the corporeal
subjects protected by common law property rights.'1 In sum,
welfare and copyright both differ from corporeal property in
practical, theoretical, and materially significant ways.
B.

Deserving Poor vs. StarvingArtists

U.S. social welfare policy has generally aimed at helping
the plight of the deserving poor. In this the United States
differs markedly from many other countries, which have
instead tended to redistribute wealth on grounds that citizens
have rights to a certain level of wealth.'82 Although some
commentators would have the United States likewise ignore
the causes of an applicant's poverty and the incentive effects of
public benefits,'" that view has evidently not prevailed. To the
contrary, recent reforms" reinforce the traditional U.S.
approach to social welfare,'" demonstrating that federal
lawmakers strongly favor limiting welfare to people who cannot
reasonably lift themselves out of dire poverty.' In that, the law
M

"'o Granted, the rights afforded by common law have of necessity changed in
response to copyright's rapid mutations. Copyright and common law make conflicting
claims to regulate social behavior, after all, and the former consistently trumps the
latter. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (making the Constitution and laws made in
pursuance of it "the supreme Law of the Land.. . ."); 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West Supp.
2003) (generally preempting any common law rights equivalent to and within the
subject matter of copyright). Nonetheless, those concomitant changes to our common
law rights come by dint only of the changes effectuated by copyright itself, as lists of
exceptions tacked onto our extant rights to person and property, rather than as
fundamental and intentional modifications of them.
"" See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS
IN A CONNECTED WORLD 19-22 (2001) (discussing why nonrivalrous goods merit
different treatment from rivalrous ones); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom
of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L. J. 147, 184 (1998)
("[Tihe nonrivalrous aspect of intellectual property infringement weakens the property
rights argument.").
182 See ESPING-ANDERSSEN, supra note 24.
'm See supraPart II.A.2 (discussing secondary justification of social welfare).
1'4 See PRWORA, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong. (1996) (replacing Aid for Families
with Dependent Children with TANF).
' See 42 U.S.C.A. 601(b) (West Supp. 2003) (providing that the PRWORA
"shall not be interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance under any
State program funded under this part.").
§ 601(a)(2) (describing as a goal for TANF, to "end the
186 See, e.g., id.
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation,
work, and marriage").
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reflects long-held 7 and prevailing'" domestic opinions about
social welfare.
The way in which U.S. welfare policy regards its
beneficiaries differs markedly from how U.S. copyright policy
regards its beneficiaries. Far from characterizing authors as
pitiable souls in desperate need of a helping hand, copyright
commentary tends to characterize them as hardworking
creators who risk suffering the depredations of unfair
copying. 9 True, we sometimes talk of how copyright helps
"starving artists." But we sympathize with those peculiar
geniuses because we respect their willingness to express
themselves at high personal cost - not because we deign to pity
them.
Query,
though,
whether
those
different
characterizations lead to different perceptions of merit. Do
most people regard welfare recipients as less deserving than
copyright's beneficiaries? If so, they surely should not do so as a
general matter. Compare a widowed mother struggling after a
long illness to find a job and feed her toddler, on the one hand,
with a feckless cad coasting on royalties earned by his deceased
father's obnoxious Christmas tune,' on the other. The former
demands more sympathy than the latter demands admiration.
Perhaps no one should disfavor welfare recipients as a
general matter, either. Suppose, for instance, that we could not
continue bearing the combined social costs of both welfare and
copyright and that, for various reasons, we had to choose
between continuing one or the other. Would we clearly err in
favoring aid to the poor over aid to authors? Surely not. Aid to
the poor has at least a prima facie appeal, one that authors'
advocates would, if we had to choose between welfare and
copyright, have a hard time rebutting. Notwithstanding the
187 See SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 234-37 (surveying American
views on social
welfare from the nineteenth century to the late 1970s).
'88 See, e.g., R. KENT WEAVER, ENDING WELFARE AS WE KNOW IT 174-77 (2000)
(reviewing public assessments of the welfare system). Weaver summarizes the
prevailing public opinion of welfare prior to the reforms of the late 1990s: "Welfare, in
short, was perceived as being at odds with the widely shared American belief in
individualism and the work ethic." Id. at 174.
'8 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (noting approvingly
that copyright term extension "protects authors' original expression from unrestricted
exploitation"); supra Part II.A.1 (discussing primary justification for copyright
protection).
'9o See, for instance, Will Freeman, a similar character played by Hugh Grant
in A3OUT A BOY (Universal Studios 2002) - but for the sake of the exercise please try to
imagine a copyright beneficiary with somewhat less rakish charm.
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contrast between how we tend to regard the beneficiaries of
welfare and how we tend to regard the beneficiaries of
copyright, therefore, the latter cannot necessarily boast greater
moral worth.
C.

TargetingExternalities

We care about the poor, among other reasons, because
we sympathize with their plight, because we hope to gain from
their improvement, and because we fear their discontent. Each
of those three reasons targets externalities, whether in an
effort to avoid negative externalities or to encourage positive
ones. Copyright targets externalities, too, but in a more
monomaniacal fashion. This subpart discusses how welfare's
approach to externalities differs from copyright's 9 ' and why
those differences, although interesting, do not appear to
significantly detract from the utility of the "author's welfare"
model of copyright.
1.

Welfare's Concern
Externalities

for

Negative

and

Positive

We care about the poor for many reasons. Some of those
reasons have little to do with externalities, while other reasons
do. Most notably, we care about the poor simply because we
include them in our calculations of how best to promote
aggregate social utility. We regard the poor as members of our
society, or in other words, deserving of our concern.'92 When we
regard welfare policy at that general a level, it differs very
little from copyright. Welfare demonstrates that we include the
poor in calculating social utility; copyright demonstrates that
we include authors. Instructive differences appear, however, in
the contrast between welfare's and copyright's concern for
externalities.

'93

We care about the poor in part because we sympathize
with them. Moralists have long regarded that sort of sympathy
9'1 I thank Professor Gene Quinn for bringing to my attention that welfare
and copyright target different sorts of externalities.
,92 I do not here attempt to delineate or justify that concern; I mean only to
duly note that some explanations of welfare do not speak in terms of externalities.
193 Readers who want to make more out of that broad similarity between
welfare and copyright will probably find themselves less convinced by the present
section's construction of a counter-argument to the paper's overall thesis. In other
words, the more you disagree with me here, the more you will agree with me generally.
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as a natural and attractive human trait.'94 The very first line of
Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments observes, for
instance, "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in
the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to
him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of
seeing it."'.. Even if unavoidable and salutary, however, our
powers of sympathy give us discomfort. We reflect on others'
poverty, imagine their stunted lives, and suffer by proxy."'
That self-imposed moral lashing encourages a number of
responses. Most notably, it encourages us to try to alleviate
poverty. We might thus fairly regard state efforts to alleviate
poverty as a response to the failure of non-state mechanisms,
such as churches, private charities, and employers, to relieve
us of the negative externalities created by our sympathy with
the poor.
Granted, that is neither a conventional nor a
particularly uplifting account. It risks encouraging not only
charity, but also some unseemly alternative responses to the
negative externalities that we suffer by dint of our natural
sympathies: ignore or chastise the poor."' But who can deny
that many people, especially the relatively rich, pursue exactly
those strategies? Viewing welfare as in part a response to our
19

See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford

Univ. Press
1998)
(1861);
DAVID HUME,
ENQUIRIES
CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (Tom L. Beauchamp
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998) (1777); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL

SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., Liberty Classics 1982) (1759). I thank
Professor Jacob T. Levy for directing me to Smith's argument.
195SMITH, supra note 194, pt. I.I.I.1,
at 9. See also MILL, supra note 194, at
30-31 ("[Slocial feelings of mankind . .. [are] already a powerful principle in human
nature.... ."); HUME, supra note 194, at 221 ("[W]herever we go, whatever we reflect on
or converse about, everything still presents us with the view of human happiness or
misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness.").
See generally Hume, supra note 194, at 218-26.
19 For recognition of that effect in a different
context, see Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967) (defining the
"demoralization costs" of uncompensated takings to include "disutilities which accrue
to losers and their sympathizers specifically from the realization that no compensation
is offered"). I thank Professor Nicole Garnett of Notre Dame School of Law for bringing
Michelman's analysis to my attention.
"' I thank Professor Chris Wonnell of the University of San Diego School of
Law for the cautionary observation that social policy might err, so far as actually
helping the poor goes, if it focuses unduly on alleviating the pains of sympathy. It
might, for instance, focus more on visible and easy problems rather than low-level,
difficult, and chronic ones. See E-mail from Chris Wonnell to Tom W. Bell (Nov. 14,
2002) (on file with the author).
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uncomfortable sympathies explains beneficence, willful
ignorance, and resentment alike, a range of responses that
Adam Smith ably documented. '" Later commentators have said
much the same thing, " albeit in more modern and technical
terms."° Readers who find that account too coldly positivist
should not give up, though; there remain two other more
conventional and perhaps comforting ways in which social
welfare represents a response to externalities.
We also care about the poor because we seek better
futures for them and, not inconsequentially, for all of us.'O To
the extent that their poverty prevents them from fulfilling their
potential - to the extent it leaves them ill, ignorant, and uncivil
- it robs the poor of more prosperous and peaceful lives.
Though the benefits of becoming more healthy, informed, and
civil accrue in the main to those who adopt them, especially
those who start in an especially debased condition, we all
benefit from living among such people. We thus care about the
198 Smith began by noting that we feel others' joys more vividly than we do

their troubles: "[W]e often struggle to keep down our sympathy with the sorrow of
others." SMITH, supra note 194, pt. I.I11.I.4, at 44. What accounts for that difference?
Smith explained that "it is painful to go along with grief, and we always enter into it
with reluctance." Id. pt. I.II.I.9, at 46 (footnote omitted). Then, consonant with the
present claim about negative externalities, Smith observed that the well-to-do
sometimes resent or try to ignore the poor:
The poor man goes out and comes in unheeded, and when in the midst of a
crowd is in the same obscurity as if shut up in his own hovel . . . . [T]he
dissipated and the gay ... turn away their eyes from him, or if the extremity
of his distress forces them to look at him, it is only to spurn so disagreeable
an object from among them. The fortunate and the proud wonder at the
insolence of human wretchedness, that it should dare to present itself before
them, and with the loathsome aspect of its misery presume to disturb the
serenity of their happiness.
Id. pt. IIII1,
at 51.
'9 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City
Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165,
1186-88 (1996) (distinguishing the negative externalities created by the mere
appearance of poor people in public places from the negative externalities created by
their chosen behaviors); Lester C. Thurow, The Income Distribution as a Pure Public
Good, 85 Q.J. ECON.. 327, 331 (1971) (arguing that redistribution of income is a "pure
public good"). I thank Professor Lawrence H. White for bringing Thurow's classic paper
to my attention.
200 Having only the terminology of pre-classical economics at hand, of course,
Adam Smith did not describe the effects of sympathy with the poor as a "negative
externality."
201 Communitarians embrace a particularly strong view of that sentiment.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (2d ed. 1982)
(describing a view in which membership in a community manifests itself not only in
"fraternal sentiments and fellow-feeling" but also in "a mode of self-understanding
constitutive of the agent's identity"). Even a person who does not especially identify
with those less well off may, however, have an interest in helping them to lead more
productive lives.
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poor, and for the poor, in part because we aim to enjoy more
positive externalities.
Less charitably, we also care about the poor because we
fear them. We fear that they will, if driven to desperation or if
schooled in envy, strike out against us. In part, then, welfare
policy reflects the aim of preventing negative externalities."' I
do not argue that this is a heroic motivation. Neither do I argue
on behalf of a cowardly social welfare policy. The Roman
Empire's experience with bread and circuses alone suggests
that rewarding social extortion proves both expensive and
ultimately futile."3 I argue merely that welfare policy reflects
some concern for minimizing the negative externalities of social
unrest. Readers who disagree will thus find this section's
arguments, which tend to show how welfare and copyright
treat externalities differently, that much less threatening to
the paper's overall thesis.
2. Copyright's Focus on Positive Externalities
By most accounts, copyright focuses on generating
positive externalities." Even the minority account, under
which copyright guards property rights in fixed expressive
works, speaks far more of rendering justice to robbed copyright
owners than it does of combating negative externalities.2 5 In
that regard, copyright policy differs from welfare policy, as
discussed in the preceding section, because welfare policy
targets at least two types of negative externalities (sympathetic
suffering and social unrest) and one positive one (increased
social well-being).
202 See FRANCES F. PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, REGULATING
THE POOR: THE

FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d ed. 1993) (arguing that U.S. welfare policies
expand during times of civil instability so as to pacify social unrest); EPSTEIN, supra
note 20, at 315-16 (considering welfare transfer payments as a defense against violence
by welfare recipients).
203 See I EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

1101-10 (Modern Library 1932) (1776) (describing how freely available public
entitlements corrupted the ancient Romans, eventually contributing to their downfall).
204 See supra Part II.A.
205 Perhaps the minority view's bias for claims of right represents a mere
chance of phrasing or an argument in the alternative. Perhaps we can rightly recast it
to express a concern for the negative externalities embodied in violations of copyright
owners' rights. If so, the present subpart's counter-argument to this paper's overall
thesis would thereby suffer a blow. If both welfare and copyright policy target both
negative and positive externalities, they share that much more in common. Content to
grapple with a stronger counter-argument, I will not press the claim that copyright
policy targets negative externalities.
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In contrast to welfare's diverse concerns, therefore,
copyright concentrates on increasing the public good afforded
by expressive works. That distinction hardly renders the
authors' welfare model worthless, however. Welfare and
copyright still share an interest in promoting positive
externalities, after all, and more generally a common interest
in shaping externalities so as to benefit the public. Whether
those externalities qualify as negative or positive, while an
interesting question, should have no more bearing on the
fundamental similarities between welfare and copyright than
does the distinction between increasing revenues and
decreasing costs. Ultimately, it all goes to social utility's bottom
line.
D.

OutgrowingFailure

Growth may render both welfare and copyright
unnecessary and, thus, unwanted. Importantly, however, the
two systems respond to different types of growth. As subsection
III.D.1 explains, economic growth offers the greatest prospect
of ameliorating the need for social welfare. As a secondary and
somewhat surprising consideration, that subsection also
observes that population growth may encourage the same
result. Subsection III.D.2, in contrast, offers population growth
as a primary means of ameliorating the need for copyright. As
a secondary consideration, that subsection adds that growth in
wealth - both financial and cultural - promises to have a

similar effect. Those interesting distinctions between welfare
and copyright, however, do not render the authors' welfare
model materially deficient.
1. Economic (and Population) Growth Makes Welfare
Less Necessary
All else being equal, economic growth ameliorates the
ills that social welfare programs aim to remedy.2" Assuming
that poor and rich alike benefit from increases in social wealth,
even if not to the same degree, at some point the poor should
find it possible to escape the woes of material deficiency.
206 See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1737

n.3 (2002) (collecting authorities in support of the claim: "Overall economic growth is
instrumental to the more general well-being of a society, including the welfare of
disadvantaged groups.").
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Welfare's intended beneficiaries should thus find, more and
more, that they can afford the market price for such basic
needs as food, shelter, and clothing. Available evidence
suggests that economic growth has just that effect."7
As aggregate wealth has grown, even less essential
goods, such as color televisions and washing machines, have
come within the reach of most welfare recipients. "° Whereas
poverty once posed a dire risk of death, in brief, it now tends to
cause disease, discomfort, and disadvantage.' Those woes cry
out for relief, of course; I do not intend to wish away the
suffering they cause. I mean only to observe that they
demonstrate how poverty poses less severe a market failure
than it once did. Will the poor, in growing richer, face down the
failures of markets, of civil institutions, and of political
redistributions to cure poverty? That remains an attractive but
uncertain vision of the future. For present purposes it suffices
to conclude that, at least in theory, the effects of economic
growth may obviate the need for social welfare programs.
Where does economic growth come from? In part,
apparently, it comes from increases in population. That
surprising claim has the backing of some surprising data.21
That wealth and population covary makes perfect sense,
though, if you understand humans as the "ultimate resource." '
Not everyone does, of course, but this is no place to press the
207 See Carles Boix, Democracy, Development, and the Public
Sector, 45 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 1 (2001) (reporting empirical evidence that economic growth increases the
amount of wealth redistributed for purposes of promoting social welfare).
2os See MAYA FEDERMAN ET. AL., LIVING CONDITIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
IN POOR

AND NON-POOR FAMILIES (1996), available at http://www.iir.berkeley.edu/publications/
livingfam.html#consumer (reporting that of families receiving welfare in 1992, 92.2%
had a working color television in their household and 66.3% had a working washing
machine therein).
209 Consider, for example, the sorts of woes that the federal
administrators
cite as justification for their welfare services: "[Ploverty is significantly correlated with
bad results for families: poor nutrition and health, unsafe housing, dangerous
neighborhoods, and inadequate cognitive development of children." DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, OFFICE
OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, HELPING FAMILIES ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY: A GUIDE ON
FUNDING SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES THROUGH THE TANF PROGRAM 5

(1999), availableat http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/funds2.pdf.
21 See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE
2, at pt. 2 (rev. ed., 1996).
21 As did, of course, the late Dr. Simon; see id. See also BJORN
LOMBORG, THE
SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001)
(collecting data that environmental conditions and human welfare have improved with
increases in population). The parallels between the arguments of Simon and Lomborg
arise, in part, because Lomborg converted from a mainstream, alarmist
environmentalist when he tried, unsuccessfully to refute many of Simon's claims. See
id. at xix.
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point. I offer it only as an interesting link between welfare and
copyright, one that partially counterbalances this subpart's
argument that the woes of poverty and unoriginality demand
different cures.
This subsection's argument - that increases in wealth
mitigate the need for social welfare - remains sound even if one
thinks wealth unlikely to increase or if one thinks increased
population destroys wealth. One may go so far as to assume
that humankind will soon perish under its own weight. The
present argument asks only that one grant the logic behind the
claim that if wealth increases, all else being equal, the poor will
benefit.
2. Population (and Wealth) Growth Makes Copyright
Less Necessary
All else being equal, population growth should
ameliorate the ills that copyright protection aims to remedy.
Why? Because, in brief, population growth will increase the
ratio between the revenues generated by authorship and the
costs of creating, reproducing, and distributing expressive
works. In other words, population growth will increase authors'
profits, thus eventually rendering copyright's incentives
inefficiently overcompensatory. This subsection spells out that
argument in a bit more detail.2 '
Two features distinguish copyrighted works from
corporeal types of property: non-rivalry in consumption
together with low marginal costs of reproduction and
distribution. But many types of copyrighted works - including
notably valuable ones like movies, books, and software - cost a
good deal to initially produce. Authors thus rightly fear that
they will not recoup their production costs without a statutory
right to limit the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of
their works; hence, the utilitarian justification for granting
copyright protection to expressive works."'
212

To some degree, the analysis parallels that standardly used to describe the

economies of scale enjoyed by natural monopolies. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 59597 (1998) (distinguishing natural monopolies from network effects). The crucial
difference, however, arises in that anyone can enjoy the low marginal costs of
reproducing an expressive work - not just the party who incurred fixed costs by
producing the work. The economies of scale in producing expressive works thus do not
accrue solely to the benefit of any would-be natural monopolist.
213 See Landes & Posner, supra note 37, at 326-29.
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There exist other mechanisms for encouraging the
production of expressive works, including tips, patronage,
automated rights management, and contract law.14 To the
extent that those alternatives allow more unauthorized uses
than copyright law does, however, they give a potential author
less incentive to become an actual author. Such "leaky"
alternatives to copyright thus threaten to under-stimulate the
production of expressive works."15 Nevertheless, population
growth promises to redeem those alternatives to copyright by
increasing authors' profits.
Holding all else equal, an increase in the number of
people who access an expressive work ought to increase the net
revenues generated by controlling access to that work. That
remains true regardless of whether copyright or other, nonstatutory mechanisms impose tolls for accessing the work. At
the same time, the relatively low cost of jointly consuming
expressive works - their non-rivalry - should hold steady as
population increases. The marginal costs of reproducing and
distributing copyrighted works looks likely to hold steady, too.
Perhaps, thanks to technological improvements or network
effects, those "retail" costs of selling access to expressive works
will even drop. However, population increases appear unlikely
to affect the "wholesale" costs of initially creating expressive
works. Holding all else equal, 216 therefore, the profits afforded
by creating, distributing, and selling access to expressive works
should increase as population increases." 1
214 See Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace:
Why Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15,
38-44 (1997) (describing a variety of technologies for protecting expressive works).
215 Cf James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis,
Price
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2029-30
(2000) (observing that policymakers concerned solely about economic effects might
approve of a "leaky" copyright system so long as it provides "adequate incentives to the
producer of the information good").
216 In practice, of course, it is not likely that all else will hold equal. Professor
Tim Wu has suggested that alternatives to copyright may distort the market for
expressive works in unfortunate ways or drive wasteful "arms races" of protection and
counter-protection. Email from Tim Wu to Tom W. Bell (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with
the author). Professor Glynn S. Lunney has argued that the tendency of spending on
luxury goods - including, notably, access to expressive works - to increase with per
capita income threatens to affect the economics of expressive works in unpredictable
ways. Email from Glynn S. Lunney to Tom W. Bell (Sept. 19, 2002) (on file with the
author). I regard those objections as sufficiently speculative to leave the present
argument plausible, however, and defer to another day a fuller treatment of those and
related questions about the future of copyright.
217 That is not to say, however, that in practice each author's profits
would
increase. If we relax the assumption that they will hold equal, we should expect
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Perhaps a lightly populated, large, and semiagricultural country with slow and costly communications
requires copyright law to encourage optimal production of
expressive works. It seems that those who wrote and ratified
the U.S. Constitution thought as much. But however well that
justification for copyright worked in years past, it works
decreasingly well now. As population grows larger, and
authorship grows more profitable, copyright grows inefficiently
overprotective. Looking forward, we cannot only imagine a
world where generosity, technology, and common law rights
supplant copyright law, we can anticipate it.
Growth in wealth also promises to help ameliorate the
need for copyright's special statutory protections. In part, it
will do so for the same reasons that growth in wealth promises
to help ameliorate the need for welfare. As with regard to
markets for food and shelter, increased wealth should, all else
being equal, make it easier both for people to buy access to
copyrighted works and for authors to fund their creative
efforts. More particularly, growth in the wealth of expressive
works to which we have access will also help to ameliorate the
need for copyright. As time passes, we enjoy larger and larger
stockpiles of expressive works. Additionally, the digital
intermedia make works old and new more readily available
than ever before. Even if copyright were necessary in the late
1700s - when books were relatively expensive, authors really
did risk starvation, and even the best libraries had scant
pickings - copyright has gotten less and less necessary as
material and cultural wealth has increased.
IV. AGAINST THE RELEVANCE OF THE AUTHORS' WELFARE
MODEL

In contrast to the prior Part, which aired arguments
that dissimilarities between welfare and copyright render the
authors' welfare model uninstructive, the present Part airs two
arguments that the model says nothing interesting. Both
arguments issue from the point of view of legal positivism.2 8
competition from extant owners of expressive works and entry by would-be authors to
move the market to a new equilibrium reflecting some mixture of increased supply and
decreased prices. Again, though, I defer a full analysis of those effects, reasoning it
would exceed the bounds of the present paper and not fundamentally change the
conclusion that population growth tends to render copyright inefficiently
overprotective.
218 More precisely, they issue from the point of view of statist legal positivism.
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Under the first argument, the authors' welfare model offers
merely another of many possible proofs that legal rights rely on
state power. Subpart IV.A. considers that argument and
condemns it for trying to prove far more than we can
reasonably accept. Under the second and related argument, the
authors' welfare model errs in characterizing copyright as a
mechanism for redistributing rights, which instead state
authorities define ab initio. Subpart IV.B considers that
argument and dismisses it as equally applicable to welfare,
thus leaving the authors' welfare model unimpeached.
In addition, either of the legal positivist arguments
looks suspect insofar as it relies on a claim that rights derive
solely from the exercise of state power. Such a claim would
contradict the foundations of U.S. law,"9 overwhelming
evidence that rights to person and property arose prior to and
exist independently of the state, " ' and even the dictates of
logic. 2 ' Regardless of their sufficiency, however, those
counterarguments are not necessary to reject the legal
positivist arguments reviewed in the following subparts, which
instead prove susceptible to more particular critiques.
A.

Banality of the Authors' Welfare Model

A legal positivist might critique the authors' welfare
model of copyright as merely another example of the universal
principle that state authorities define legal rights." ' As such,
See BARNETT, supra note 89, at 18-22 (explaining the difference between statist legal
positivism and natural legal positivism). Because natural legal positivism almost
certainly supports rather than undermines the claim that both welfare and copyright
redistribute rights, see Barnett, supra note 86, this Part's discussion of arguments from
legal positivism concerns only those arising from the statist variety.
219 Both the Declaration of Independence
and the U.S. Constitution plainly
reflect the view, as does social contract theory in general, that those who enter into
governments bring pre-existing rights with them. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[AIIl men.., are endowed by their creator with
certain inalienable rights ....); U.S. CONST. amend. IX (referring to rights retained by
the people).
220 See, e.g., BRUCE BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE
OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT THE

STATE (1990).
2, See Tom G. Palmer, Saving Rights Theory
from Its Friends, in INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS RECONSIDERED 35, 40-52 (Tibor Machan ed., 2001) (criticizing statist legal
positivism for infinite regress, circularity, and incoherence).
222 See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE COST OF RIGHTS:
WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 19 (1999) ("Statelessness spells rightslessness.");
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 212 (Wilfrid E. Rumble

ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832) ("[Elvery law simply and strictly so called...
is set directly or circuitously, by a monarch or sovereign number, to a person or persons
in a state of subjection to its author.").
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the model would fail to illustrate anything very fundamental or
interesting. On that view, one might just as well analogize
copyrights to broadcast licenses, lottery tickets, taxicab
medallions, or any other right enforced by state coercion,
because they all reveal the same banal truth.2 3
That argument fails because it tries to prove too much.
Regardless of whether they have similar traits in a very
general and fundamental sense, different legal rights have
materially different details. At the least, a legal positivist (of
all people) ought to take heed of the fact that U.S. courts favor
common law rights over statutory rights. The Supreme Court
has long held that "'statutes which invade the common law...
are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of
long-established and familiar principles, except when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'224 As a practical
matter, therefore, the rights created by welfare and copyright
legislation share the same inferior status relative to the
common law rights that they contradict.
More generally, why would a legal positivist deny that
courts and commentators can find instructive parallels between
rights, such as welfare rights and copyright rights, that share a
great deal in common? An overzealous positivist might just as
well argue that we should abandon arguments from legal
precedent because, in a very general and fundamental sense,
all judicial decisions represent determinations of legal rights.
Courts and commentators rightly resist so corrosive an effect of
pure theory,22 continuing instead to rely on the case-by-case
reasoning that has served the law so long and so well. 26

223 I thank Professors Eugene Volokh and Justin Hughes for independently

offering this critique of the authors' welfare model.
224 United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Isbrandtsen Co.
v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)) (omission in original). See also Astoria Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that Congress legislates
against a backdrop of common law principles); Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth. v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35 (1983) (quoting Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 603 (1813) (explaining that common law
principles "ought not be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be
clear and explicit for this purpose")).
...See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown &
Co. 1944) (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
...See ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY 303
(1988) (contrasting the prevailing theoretical bent of moral philosophy with legal
reasoning and observing: "If we go back even to Coke or Clarendon, the history of
Anglo-American common law has never despised 'case studies.").
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Copyright's Definition, Rather than Redistribution,of
Rights

Relatedly, a legal positivist might argue that because all
rights derive from the exercise of sovereign authority, the
authors' welfare model errs in describing copyright as a
statutory mechanism for redistributingrights. To call copyright
"redistributive," the positivist might object, wrongly presumes
that rights exist prior to the state."' The critique would
conclude with the claim that copyright merely serves as one of
the many tools, like tort or criminal law, through which state
authorities define rights to tangible property.28'
Because that argument applies just as well to welfare"
as to copyright, however, it does nothing to diminish the
authors' welfare model. If copyright does not redistribute
rights, then neither does welfare. In that event, both systems
would define rights in the first instance. Even generously
granting the legal positivist argument against the whole notion
of redistribution, the analogy between welfare and copyright
remains unblemished.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT AS
AUTHORS' WELFARE

Understanding copyright as akin to welfare suggests at
least two conclusions: We should reconsider how we speak (and
thus think) about copyright, and we should consider changing
the laws that create and sustain it. Subpart V.A takes up the
former topic, discussing how the authors' welfare model might
improve rhetoric about copyright. Subpart V.B takes up the
latter, discussing what the authors' welfare model suggests
about reforming copyright policy.
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See, e.g., HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 222, at 17 ("Under American

law, rights are powers granted by the political community.").
228 I thank Professors Tony Arnold and Kurt Eggert for independently
offering
this critique of the authors' welfare model.
29 Relatedly, commentators have argued that welfare rights are
no different
in principle from other rights, as enforcement of any right gives rise to social costs. See,
e.g., HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, supra note 222, at 219 ("[Aipparently nonwelfare rights are
welfare rights, too.").
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Copyright Rhetoric

Rhetoric matters. Far from mere word play, it changes
and, thus, actions.3 ' Misleading rhetoric32 can therefore
lead to unfortunate choices, actions, or habits. Conversely,
better rhetoric - rhetoric that gives us useful handles for the
world' - can remedy the ills caused by wrong words,
encouraging us to act more efficiently and equitably.
What does the above catalog of similarities,
dissimilarities, and ramifications thereof suggest about how we
might improve the rhetoric of copyright? In brief, it suggests
that we should question how well the language of property
applies to copyright and that we should experiment with the
"authors' welfare" analogy. The following two subsections
respectively expand on those points.
minds 3.

1. Copyrights as Entitlements
The material similarities between welfare and copyright
suggest that we should not wholeheartedly characterize
copyright as a form of property. Granted, as discussed above,
welfare rights have fewer property-like features than copyright
rights do. 3' As also discussed above, however, welfare and
copyright continue to share material dissimilarities with
corporeal property.236 The authors' welfare model thus suggests
230

See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1355b27-28 (W. Rhys Roberts

trans.) (c. 335-20 B.C.), in II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2155 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984) ("Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given
case the available means of persuasion.").
231See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk.VI, ch. 2, at 1139a32-3 (W.D.
Ross, trans., rev. by J.O. Urmson) (c. 335-20 B.C.), in II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1798 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) ("The origin of action... is choice, and
that of choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end.").
232See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355b18 (W. Rhys Roberts trans.)
(c. 335-20 B.C.), in II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2155 (Jonathan Barnes ed.,
1984) ("What makes a man a sophist is not his abilities but his choices.").
M In other words, unfortunate words can encourage vice. See generally
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, bk. II, ch. 1-4 (W. Rhys Roberts trans.) (c. 335-20 B.C.), in II
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2154 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (characterizing
virtue and vice in terms of good and bad habits).
234See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. III, ch. 2, at 1405a10-11 (W.D.
Ross, trans., rev. by J.O. Urmson) (c. 335-20 B.C.), in II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1729 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) ("Metaphors . . . must be fitting, which
means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified."). See also id. bk. III, ch.
4, at 1406b26 (explaining that similes "are to be employed just as metaphors are
employed . . ").
235 See supra Part III.A.
211See id.
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viewing copyright not as a property right but rather as a
statutory entitlement.
I compare the role of property in copyright rhetoric to
the alternative offered by welfare both because the former
proves so popular and because the latter offers such an original
and revealing view of copyright. The authors' welfare model
encourages us to ask questions different from those triggered
by the property model and to explore interesting answers to
those questions.37 There remain other ways of viewing
copyright, however. I here briefly touch on two of them," albeit
solely to explain why I do not contrast them with the authors'
welfare model.
Although the leading justification of copyright clearly
frames it in terms of social utility,"O it tends to treat copyright
as a singular and unique instrument of public policy. It does
not, in other words, rely on an analogy between copyright and
any other particular program or institution. Many or most
public policies aim at social utility; few if any expressly admit
to harming the public in the name of some overriding goal.2 "
Most commentators who take the social utility view analyze
copyright in the same generic terms employed by all policy
wonks.24' Such commentators would probably not feel compelled
to choose between the property and welfare models of copyright
discussed here.
Notwithstanding the "non-model" stance of that school
of copyright, some of its adherents 4 ' arguably view copyright as
akin to a particular type of quasi-public institution: the
237 By way of example, the authors' welfare model encouraged me
to ask first
myself, and then my peers, whether it would constitute a taking under the Fifth
Amendment were lawmakers to reduce the scope or term of copyright. See Tom W. Bell,
Could Amending the (C) Act Constitute a Taking?, Email from Tom W. Bell to
CyberProf listserve (March 3, 2003) (copy on file with the author). I might not have
thought to ask that question if I had not had welfare reform in mind. A lively
discussion followed, demonstrating how the authors' welfare model can help even
experts in copyright law to discover new legal issues.
For discussion of yet another copyright metaphor, one based on paternity,
see Rose, supra note 18. I do not treat the metaphor separately, however, as it appears
so closely linked to the property metaphor.
239 See supra Part II.A.1.
240 Even politicians who enslave and kill
their subjects tend to tout larger,
long-term utility gains, if only for particular constituents.
241 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note
37.
242 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:
The New Economic
Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Dennis S. Karjala,
Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV.
511(1997); Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283 (1996).
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common carrier.2 3 On that view, lawmakers loan private
parties the state's power to seize property - real property in the
case of common carriers exercising the power of eminent
domain,244 and rights to chattels and persons in the case of
authors exercising copyrights.2 5 Lawmakers condition that
statutory monopoly, however,
on giving the public
nondiscriminatory access to the resulting benefits - carriage in
the case of transportation and telecommunications networks,24
and fair use... in the case of copyrighted works."8 That common
carrier analogy to copyright remains at best implicit. I will thus
not press the point here. It seems more prudent to forestall
comparing the welfare model of copyright to the common
carrier model unless and until commentators expressly
embrace the latter view.
We already have good reasons to regard copyright as a
form of entitlement, however. At the least, we ought to do so as
a judicious counterbalance to the rise of rhetoric that
inaccurately equates copyright to corporeal property. Even
apart from its use as a palliative, moreover, the authors'
welfare model offers us a fresh perspective on copyright's old
problems.
2.

Metaphorically
Welfare"

Experimenting

with

"Authors'

Comparing the limitations of the property metaphor
with the advantages of the welfare metaphor suggests that we
might benefit from considering copyright in light of the latter.
It does not give us cause to wholly abandon the copyright-asproperty model, of course. It simply gives us cause to
experiment with the authors' welfare model. One might say
243 For a characterization of that as a 'circuit switched"
model of copyright,
see Bell, supra note 36, at 804.
141 See James H. Lister, The Rights
of Common Carriers and the Decision
Whether to be a Common Carrieror a Non-Regulated Communications Provider, 53
FED. COMM. L.J. 91, 103 (2000) (describing how federal and state laws allow delegation
of power of eminent domain to common carriers).
245 See supra Part
I.D.
246 See EPSTEIN, supra note 20, at 168-69 (describing
obligations that common
carriers must bear in return for enjoying the benefits of eminent domain).
247 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West
Supp. 2003).
248 The common carrier model of copyright
arguably suggests compulsory
licensing rather than fair use as the way to provide the public with discriminatory
access to copyrighted works, however, because those who avail themselves of fair use
resemble free riders more than they do paying passengers.
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that property and welfare offer us different maps of copyright's
sphere, generated by different projections. Because neither
map equals the territory, 249 and each has its uses, it behooves
us to understand copyright as like both property and welfare.
I do not mean to equate those two views of copyright,
however. Some metaphors have more use than others have. A
poor metaphor might illustrate only relatively few or
unimportant things about copyright, perhaps even misleading
us in harmful ways. Contrariwise, a better metaphor for
copyright might enrich the coherence, power, and accuracy of
our thinking. We thus can and should eventually evaluate the
relative virtues of the property and welfare models of
copyright. But that should come later, after we have had time
to put the welfare model to more use. The arguments set forth
here against the property analogy and for the welfare analogy
2
thus aim merely to encourage metaphorical experimentation. 1
In the spirit of encouraging such experimentation, Table
3 below displays some parallels between the extant
terminology of welfare and the suggested terminology of
copyright. Readers will find the reasons for most of those
pairings obvious by this point, as I have employed "authors'
welfare," "copyright system," and "redistribution of rights"
throughout this paper. What about the parallel between
"AFDC" and "ACPE"? The former, of course, stood for "Aid for
Families with Dependent Children," a federal program
effectively abolished in 1996.251 The latter, fictional acronym
2 52
stands for "Aid for Creators with Positive Externalities."
Though admittedly a bit of a jape, the term both accurately
reflects the primary justification for copyright 253 and suggests
that, like AFDC, copyright represents yet another welfare
program ripe for reform.

249 See ALFRED KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY 58 (1958) ("A map is not the
territory ....).
250 So-called both because it would test the welfare metaphor in actual use

and because any such rhetorical science, far from employing lab-coats and beakers,
must embrace a good deal of art.
251 See PROWORA, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (repealing AFDC and replacing it with TANF).
252 I borrow it from Bell, supra note 9, at 6.
253 See supra Part II.A.1.
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Table 3: Terminological Parallels Between Welfare and Copyright
Term

B.

Welfare's Version

Copyright's Version

Policy

Social welfare

Authors' we Ifare

Institution

Welfare system

Copyright system

Mechanism

Redistribution of wealth Redistribution of rights

Acronym

AFDC

ACPE

Copyright Policy

The material similarities between welfare and copyright
suggest that U.S. lawmakers should consider reforming
copyright for the reasons and in the ways that they recently
reformed welfare. Because both welfare and copyright
represent exceptional responses to market failure,2
the
policies supporting them derive their justifications only
contingently, based on the continued existence of problems
sufficient to necessitate the statutory redistributions of rights
that alone give rise to welfare and copyright.2 55 Both welfare
and copyright should thus change in scope as the world around
them changes.256 For various reasons,2 7 however, we cannot
expect lawmakers to fine-tune any entitlement program in
exact step with its beneficiaries' needs. Indeed, we might well
prefer
that
lawmakers
not
even
attempt
such
micromanagement. Welfare reform wisely sidestepped that
problem by building responsiveness into the program,
restructuring benefits so as to encourage recipients to wean
themselves off of public assistance.58 Copyright reformers
would do well to adopt a similar approach.
Why should reform aim at weaning copyright owners
from their reliance on statutory rights? Much of the argument
for that policy follows as a matter of course from the analogy
between welfare and copyright. In brief, both represent
necessary evils that, as such, should shrink as they become
redundant.2 59 Because the social costs of welfare - coercively
254

See supra Part HA.

255 See supra Part II.C, D.

See supra Part III.D.
Among such reasons: public choice problems, institutional inertia, and
limits on information available to lawmakers.
258 See generally WEAVER, supra note 188, at 328-35.
259 Regarding that view of copyright, see generally Bell, supra note 36.
256
257
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redistributing wealth and encouraging sloth - may appear
more salient than those of copyright, it bears emphasizing that
copyright's benefits do not come for free. As already noted,
copyright relies on forcibly redistributing rights no less than
welfare does. 260 By dint of the artificial monopoly it creates,
moreover, copyright imposes deadweight social losses.
The entitlements afforded by the copyright system, like
those afforded by the welfare system, also have untoward
effects. Stories about "welfare queens" and concern about the
incentive effects of public assistance helped to generate
widespread support for welfare reform. We might likewise
speak of "copyright kings" who abuse their statutory rights by
making bogus legal threats or who, thanks to lawmakers'
liberal extensions of copyright terms, grow increasingly
dependent on the royalties earned on old works.
None of this goes to show that either welfare or
copyright imposes a net social loss. Rather, it goes to show that
both welfare and copyright impose gross social costs and,
crucially, that each policy merits reforms ensuring that its
costs do not exceed its benefits. Recent welfare reforms
implemented mechanisms that, however imperfect, at least
aspire to that goal. Copyright policy, in contrast, thus far
reflects almost no awareness of the concomitant need to ensure
that authors do not over-rely on their statutory rights.
Copyright commentators have only just begun to
recognize the need for such reforms. Professor Lawrence
Lessig, for instance, recently called for requiring that copyright
protection of a work be conditioned on its owner paying a small
fee fifty years after the work's publication.2 ' That would at
least have the salutary effect of removing clearly unwanted
statutory protections. Copyright owners would have little
incentive to actually forego their statutory protections,
however, unless such fees came more rapidly and at steeply
2W
261

See supra Part IL.C.
See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., FairUse and Market Failure:Sony Revisited, 82

B.U. L. REV. 975, 995-96 (2002) (explaining that the economic rents afforded by
copyright, because they allow a copyright owner price use of a work above the owner's
marginal costs, creates deadweight social losses); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright
and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 293 (1996) (same).
262 See WEAVER, supra note 188, at 171-72.
2
But see Bell, supra note 36, at 798-801 (arguing that copyright the misuse
doctrine reflects a concern about abuse of statutory rights).
2
Lawrence Lessig, Protecting Mickey Mouse at Art's Expense, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2003, at A17 (op-ed).
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increasing rates, in a manner akin to patent fees. 65 I, too, have
elsewhere suggested reforms designed to open exit options from
copyright's statutory scheme." To judge from welfare reform,
ending copyright as we know it will require much more
detailed policy proposals than commentators have yet to
muster. The authors' welfare model offers few particulars in
that regard. But it does suggest broad outlines for copyright
reform. It also makes the appeal of such reforms more readily
apparent. As the next and concluding Part explains, that
should prove an increasingly useful service.
VI. CONCLUSION: ENDING COPYRIGHT AS WE KNOW IT

This Article's introduction suggested that readers might
fruitfully hold the authors' welfare model to something like the
novelty, non-obviousness, and usefulness standards applied to
U.S. utility patents."7 I think it meets that test, naturally, even
as I realize that some readers might disagree. Trusting that at
least some readers will find that the authors' welfare model
offers a new and helpful advance in copyright commentary, I
will not repeat the arguments on its behalf. Instead, I here
close by discussing the advantages of employing the model. To
recur to the patent analogy, in other words, I turn from
defending the idea's validity to encouraging its use."
Copyright policy has, in recent years, become a matter
of heated public debate.26' While that fresh burst of attention
may give copyright commentators cause to celebrate, it also
indicates that copyright policy has encountered more difficult
problems than it has ever encountered before. Evidently, no old
solution has yet to solve them. The authors' welfare model thus
merits consideration if only because it offers a new approach
and possibly some new solutions to the new problems of
copyright policy.
Additionally, the authors' welfare model should prove
especially useful in the sort of deliberations that will
261 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16-28 (2001) (describing various
patent fees).
266 See Bell, supra note 36, at

793-803.

267

See supra Part I.

2

Unlike the typical patentee, however, I do not aim to
license my

arguments.

269See

Siva Vaidhyanathan, After the Copyright Smackdown: What Next,

SALON, Jan. 17, 2003, at http://archive.salon.contech/feature/2003/01/17/copyrightt
(last visited on June 12, 2003) (claiming "public awareness of copyright has
blossomed.").
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increasingly shape copyright policy. As Professor Shubha
Ghosh has suggested, the recent Supreme Court case of Eldred
v. Reno7 ° stands to "deconstitutionalize" copyright policy,
making it less a matter for judges and lawyers to shape than
voters, and
commentators,
lobbyists,
legislators,
for
consumers.271 To them, for whom the rhetoric of property has so
often proved influential, the authors' welfare model offers a
particularly accessible and usefully fresh view of copyright
policy.
The authors' welfare model certainly does not offer the
one true view of copyright; no mere analogy could. It probably
does not offer the best view of copyright for all purposes, either.
Because different tasks call for different tools, other models of
copyright may prove more useful in particular cases. Perhaps
the authors' welfare model does not even offer a better view of
copyright, all told, than older, more established views. Even so,
it would still offer a novel view of copyright, one that merits
further experimental use.

270 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
271

See Siva Vaidhyanathan, supra note 269 (quoting Shubha Ghosh).

